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Abstract
Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is
little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict proneness of Muslimmajority states. Existing studies either offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer
from methodological flaws. If we analyze the proportion of countries with large Muslim
populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority states do in fact stand
out. What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what extent
does religion play a role in promoting violence? Under which conditions ethno-political
organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their political goals? Under which conditions
Islamist parties denounce violence and shift from radical to moderate, pragmatist positions?
These questions are yet to be fully addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature,
this

dissertation

investigates

the

empirical

nexus

between

Islam

and

political

violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict,
group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party
moderation. I explore the role of religion and Islamist ideology in driving political violence in
the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focuses on Islamist party
moderation. I argue that religion alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflictprone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to resort to
violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. Higher prevalence of repressive
regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic
conflict. The overall findings indicate that, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature,
neither religious fractionalization nor Islam promotes political violence once socio-economic and
political factors are taken into account. Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately
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involved in domestic armed conflict, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per
capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate
strongly with domestic armed conflict. Moreover, the analysis of Islamist parties suggest that
Islamist parties respond to societal changes, renounce violence and moderate their radical
ideologies when they are given a chance to participate in the political system.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1

In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death as a protest after his
cart is taken away by police. This incident created a spillover effect of violent and nonviolent
protests in many Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring. So far, the Arab Spring
successfully toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya while the protests in Syria
transformed into a bloody civil war. Both academicians and policy makers are wondering about
the causes of these ongoing protests and the cycle of violence in the Middle East. In fact, it is not
uncommon to see politically oriented violence in the Middle East, as well as in other parts of the
Muslim world.
While some scholars argue that unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions such
as state repression, income inequality, and unemployment are driving violence in the Muslim
world, others emphasize the influence of religion in fostering violence (Dalacoura 2011; Fish et
al. 2010; Hafez 2003; Huntington 1996; Toft 2007; Zaidise et al 2007). Not surprisingly, since
9/11, Islam is used as an explanatory concept for many issues involving Muslims. More
specifically, even among scholars, there is the tendency to refer to Islamic culture to explain
many failures in the Muslim world without proper research (Roy 2004). Yet, the Muslim world
is very diverse; there is no unique Islam and the understanding/practice of Islam differs
considerably from one region to another. For example, while many mainstream religious leaders
and Muslims contend that those who kill civilians in the name of Islam are not Muslims, some
militant groups with an “Islamist” ideology argue the opposite; they believe that those who
denounce the physical struggle against nonbelievers are not Muslims (Vertigans 2009). What
explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world? To what extent does religion
play a role in promoting violence? Even though public interest in this subject significantly
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increased especially after 9/11 terrorist attacks, these questions remain underexplored and
existing studies suffer from oversimplification or methodological flaws.
Some scholars argue that religious fundamentalism and/or political Islam is a reaction to
modernity; the goal is protection of religious identity from modernity and secularism (Ayoob
2005; Fox 2004). Modern social scientists such as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Max Weber,
predicted that modernity would lead to the institutional separation of religious and secular
spheres as well as the marginalization and decline of religion (Appleby 2000). Contrary to the
expectations of modernization and secularization theory, the portion of the world population
adhering to Christianity, Islam and Hinduism increased from fifty percent in 1900 to sixty-four
percent in 2000 (Toft et al 2011:2). In-line with this trend, the influence of religion on politics
has also increased (Armstrong 2009; Berger 1999; Fox 2007; Philpott 2007). Toft et al. note that
“Once passive, religion is now assertive and engaged. Once local, it is now global. Once
subservient to the powers that be, religion has often become prophetic and resistant to politicians
at every level” (2011:3). Ironically, the resurgence of religion is facilitated by the dynamics of
modernization (which predicted the demise of religion) such as democracy, technological
improvements in communication, and globalization. The crises in secular ideologies also
contributed to this religious resurgence (Toft et al 2011).1
The religious resurgence that we have witnessed since the 1960s has led to the increasing
impact of religion in politics. In many parts of the world, religious institutions have prominent
public roles and the public-private distinction is blurred (Appleby 2000). The increasing
influence of religion on politics is also manifested in wars. Civil wars driven by religious
differences have increased over time as they are often cited to be more destructive, more likely to
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Many secular governments have failed to provide prosperity and stability in the developing countries. As a result,
secular ideologies lost popularity whereas ideologies inspired by religion became more prominent.
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recur, and longer lasting compared with non-religious civil wars (Toft 2007). In 2010, 50% of
sixteen ongoing civil wars had a religious basis (Toft et al. 2011).
Religion has the potential to promote conflict by influencing the identity, loyalty and
political goals of people. However, religious goals and identities often mix with non-religious
goals in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). Religious cleavages are not clearly distinguishable from
ethnic grievances in some cases and, therefore, may not be the root cause of many supposedly
religious domestic armed conflicts (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). For example, Appleby points
out that the exact role of religion in the Bosnian war (1992-1995) is not clear. Even though
religious symbols were clearly utilized, some analysts point out that the most Bosnian Muslims
were secularized and only a few Serb or Croat nationalist leaders were practicing Catholicism or
Orthodoxy. For instance, according to Paul Mojzes, a religious historian, the Bosnian war was
primarily ethno-national, not religious (Appleby 2000: 67-68). Similarly, it is not exactly clear
whether the Chechen fighters in Russia and the Palestinians (e.g., Hamas in Gaza) are motivated
by religion or nationalism.
Some scholars (Fox 2007; Toft et al. 2011) criticize the tendency on the part of
international relations scholarship to underestimate the impact of religion by emphasizing social
and economic causes, whereas other scholars (Canetti et al. 2010; Fish et al. 2010; Sorli et al.
2005) are more skeptical about the impact of religion. Toft et al. argue that ‘religion is a basic
driver of politics in its own right’ (2011:219). On the other hand, Canetti et al. (2010) and
Zaidise et al. (2007) argue that socio-economic deprivation plays a mediating role between
political violence and religion. As Coward and Smith (2004) point out, religious texts and
practices are open to interpretation. Therefore, the interpretation or manipulation of religion by
social actors explains how the same religious sources could be used to promote both violence
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and peace. Moreover, improvements in cross-cultural communication caused religious
polycentrism. Therefore, seemingly religious behaviors cannot be explained by religious
affiliation alone.
Extremists, who argue that they uphold the fundamentals of religion, are highly selective
in choosing religious doctrines to justify violence. Thus, they convince uneducated ordinary
believers by using selective religious scriptures, which seemingly endorse violence (Appleby
2000). While there are instances when Islamic groups tend to shift from radical to moderate
positions, or vice versa, there is little evidence that these shifts in strategies stem from religious
teachings. For example, the concept of “Jihad” can be used both to justify violence and peaceful
activities since it is interpreted differently by different Muslims. Classical Islamic scholars point
out two primary types of jihad: the greater jihad and the lesser jihad. The first one refers to the
spiritual struggle to be a morally better person by fighting off immoral desires, whereas the latter
one, which is only a means to achieve the greater jihad, refers to a physical struggle permitted
under certain conditions such as self-defense or oppression. Yet, contemporary radical Islamist
groups redefined jihad as an individual duty for all Muslims to fight against non-Muslims as well
as some seemingly “Muslim” leaders. So, any person who does not follow Islam and who
prevents “the realization of Islam” becomes a legitimate target of jihad (Mandaville 2006).
Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence.2 It is
argued that Islam is intolerant towards nonbelievers and hence, it is inherently conflict-prone.
The scholars who refer to Islamic culture to explain prevalence of domestic and inter-state
conflict in the Muslim world rely on the concept of jihad, some selective historical cases, and
selective verses from the Koran (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance, Huntington
(1996) argues that “Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards”. Yet, numerous quantitative
2
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studies have tested Huntington’s (1996) famous “clash of civilizations” thesis and found little or
no empirical support.3 Similarly, some scholars claim that Islam encourages the use of violence
against non-Muslims since the obligation of jihad calls for a fight against nonbelievers (Laquer
2003). All in all, even though these scholars do not necessarily explore the causal factors that
lead to Muslim-majority states’ disproportionate involvement in intra-state conflicts, they still
characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict prone in general.
However, Muslims historically have been mostly peaceful and tolerant. Just two decades
ago, religious ideologies in the Middle East were not popular at all and suicide terror in the name
of jihad was very rare (Mousseau 2011). Moreover, socio-economic and political grievances may
be the root cause of seemingly religiously oriented violence. For example, public opinion
surveys show that those who think 9/11 terrorist attacks are justified are not Islamists at all and
most radical Muslims have a Western education, not a religious one (Kurzman 2011; Roy 2004).
According to a survey conducted in 2001, seventy five percent of Muslims believe that the US
foreign policy was partly responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Kurzman 2011). Similarly, Roy
(2004:46) notes that “Al Qaeda did not attack Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome but the World
Trade Center; it targeted modern imperialism”.
To sum up, while theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are
abundant, there are only a handful of empirical studies. The existing studies provide mixed
evidence regarding Islam’s role in promoting conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007; Sorli et al 2005;
Toft e al 2011). There is no scholarly consensus about the extent to which religion in general and
the Islamic faith in particular, may foster violence. Does religion have an independent effect on
conflicts regardless of socio-economic conditions or does it act as a catalyst under certain

3
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circumstances? Under what conditions do ethno-political organizations resort to violence? Are
religious organizations more violence-prone than others? Under what conditions do Islamist
parties renounce the use of violent means and ideologically and behaviorally moderate? These
questions are yet to be addressed systematically.
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to these literatures by investigating the
empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence. This dissertation will
specifically focus on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence
(such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. The benefits of this
research are threefold. First, it sheds light on the complex relationship between Islam and
political violence through a more systematic, theoretically oriented and empirical analysis that
better controls for alternative explanations for political violence. Second, understanding the
factors that make ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies over non-violent ones has
significant policy implications. The findings of this research are likely to inform policy makers
and assist them in developing strategies that help to reduce the threat of religious radicalism.
Third, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process) is
necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the “Arab Spring.” Islamist parties
are key political actors in the Middle East and their degree of commitment to liberal democratic
principles as well as the moderation process will be very influential during the democratic
transitions in the region.
Chapter Outline
In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing domestic
armed conflicts and I empirically test competing arguments proposed by scholars to explain
domestic conflict in the Muslim world. Muslim-majority states’ domestic conflict proneness is
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explained by a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere
descriptive statistics. In this chapter, I first review the literature on Islam and political violence,
and domestic armed conflict, respectively. Second, I compare the prevalence of domestic armed
conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality countries to other countries by
using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model and
conduct logistic regression analysis to test my hypotheses. I argue that the higher prevalence of
repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges in the Islamic world make Muslim-plurality
countries very vulnerable to domestic armed conflict. I utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program’s recent data for the 1981-2009 period to test my hypotheses. The empirical findings
show that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionally involved in domestic armed
conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state
repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed
conflict. The significance of Islam disappears when controls for such factors are included in the
statistical model.
In chapter 3, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under which ethnopolitical organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. This chapter builds on the
previous chapter by focusing on factors that increase the probability of the use of violence at the
group-level rather than country-level. The review of the literature suggests that ethno-political
organizations’ decision to use violence is influenced by the existence of grievances, political
opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology of the
organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of youth
bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political
organizations. Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend to be
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likely recruits for violent organizations. I use the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior
(MAROB) dataset, which includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and
North Africa to test my hypotheses. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of
violence differs from the previous chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that
promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive
states, and youth bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethnopolitical organizations. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are
no more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings
of the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than
religion drives the decision to resort to violence. Some scholars argue that youth have played a
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Those young people, dissatisfied
with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their
governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter support
the argument that the existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increases the probability of
resorting to violence.
In chapter 4, I examine causal factors that contribute to moderation of Islamist parties.
While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist
parties is equally important, which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the
evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better
understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the
wake of the “Arab Awakening.” Shifting from radical to moderate positions has been a common
trend for many Islamist parties. However, there exists great variation—both among Islamists
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and others—as to what the notion of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catchall term. What forms does Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of
moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and
forms of Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of the
Communist moderation literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in
Islamist moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical
moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties leave armed struggle and
decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without
compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international
factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to
shifts in platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes
(economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to
gain greater popular support. Empirically, the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice
and Development in Morocco are analyzed in a comparative perspective.
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the key findings and contributions of this dissertation to
the social science literature. I also discuss potential policy implications and provide final remarks
for future research in this concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 2

The Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence”: What Explains Prevalence of
Domestic Armed Conflicts in the Muslim World?

13

A.

Abstract

Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence,
there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict
proneness of countries with large Muslim populations. The studies that do exist either
offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer from methodological flaws that
bring into question their very findings. If we analyze the proportion of countries with
large Muslim populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority
states do in fact stand out. How can we explain this high hazard of intra-state conflict
among countries with large Muslim populations? To what extent, if at all, Islamic faith
is a contributing factor to this phenomenon? Indeed, might there be potentially
overlooked socio-economic or political characteristics that explain the seeming
association between Islam and intra-state conflict? These questions have yet to be fully
addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, this chapter investigates the
empirical nexus between Islam and domestic armed conflict through the conditional
factors of relative deprivation and opportunity structures. I argue that higher prevalence
of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very
vulnerable to domestic armed conflicts. Further, the role of state repression is examined
in relation to domestic armed conflict onset, which has largely been ignored in existing
research. Utilizing Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s recent data for the 1981-2009
period, the findings indicate that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately
involved in domestic armed conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower
GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of
which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict onset. The significance of Islam
disappears when controls for such factors are included in the statistical model. Among
the factors that increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, the presence of a youth
bulge has the greatest impact in Muslim-plurality countries.
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B. Introduction
Not surprisingly, the tragic events of 9/11 led to growing interest in the topic of religion and
violence for the common audience and for scholars alike. As the terrorists were self-declared
jihadists, it was also no surprise that Islam became very closely associated with political violence.
While it is true that a large proportion of terrorist attacks during recent decades have been
committed by Muslims in the name of Islam (Fish et al 2010), some scholars blame the Western
media for an exaggerated and undue association of Islam and violence (Ahmed 2011; Said 1997).
A prominent instance is the bombing of the Federal Office building in Oklahoma City in 1995
and its initial attribution to Muslims (Ahmed 2011). Similarly, when Anders Behring Breivik
killed 76 civilians in Norway in 2011, some media outlets in the US rushed to blame Muslims.
The New York Times featured a headline: “Powerful Explosions Hit Oslo; Jihadis Claim
Responsibility.” Interestingly, the killer was initially labeled a terrorist; once the media
discovered that the attack was committed by a right wing Norwegian, he was described as a
“madman” or simply as “insane.” 4
Besides the media, many scholars either implicitly or explicitly argue that the Islamic
faith is particularly conflict-prone (Ben-Dor and Pedahzur 2003; Huntington 1993; 1996; Lewis
2001; 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For example, Huntington (1996) argues that “Islam has
bloody borders and bloody innards”. Huntington contends that future conflicts in the world will
be between different civilizations, especially between the Islamic and Western civilizations.
However, Huntington’s thesis relies on a selective reading of history. Numerous quantitative
studies have tested Huntington’s conjectures and found little or no empirical support.5 Historian
Bernard Lewis (1990:8) states that “It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a
4

“When it is easy to blame Muslims”, Today’s Zaman, July 27 2011; Dr. Abdullahi Sheikh Rashid.
Many studies have challenged Huntington’s thesis. For a comprehensive list of quantitative studies testing
Huntington’s thesis, see Fox (2007: 366).
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movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them.
This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of
an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide
expansion of both.” There is also some evidence that Muslim majority states are more likely to
engage in domestic conflicts than other states (Fox 2007; Toft 2007). On the other hand, some
scholars criticize the tendency to stereotype the Islamic faith as violence-prone and refer to the
diversity within the Muslim world and suggest that other socio-economic factors explain the
seeming conflict-proneness of Muslim countries (Ahmad 2011; Esposito 1992; Hafez 2003;
Zaidise et al 2007).
While theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are abundant, as
Fish et al. (2010) and Fox (2004) note, there are only a handful of systematic empirical studies.
The extant research on the relationship between Islam and violence largely relies on case studies,
which prevents making broad generalizations (Fish 2011). Further, the existing studies provide
mixed evidence regarding Islam’s role in promoting domestic conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007;
Sorli et al 2005; Toft et al 2011). While religion can incite conflict by influencing the identity,
loyalty, and political goals of people, religious ends and identities mix with non-religious goals
in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). This chapter argues that Islam alone does not necessarily make
countries more or less conflict-prone. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslimmajority countries are characterized by a higher rate of domestic armed conflict and political
violence fail to control for factors that increase the risk of conflict, such as socio-economic
development, state repression, and oil dependence, and confound many variables under “Islam”.
Without controlling for confounding factors, we cannot evaluate the impact of Islam on conflict
properly.
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This chapter focuses on the onset of domestic armed conflict and contributes to the
research on Islam and political violence by examining the causal factors that explain variation in
the prevalence of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality states 6 . I argue that higher
prevalence of repressive regimes, youth bulge, and oil dependent economies, all of which highly
correlate with domestic armed conflict onset, make Muslim-plurality countries particularly
vulnerable to intra-state conflicts. In other words, Muslim-plurality states should be no more
conflict prone than others once we control for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. This
chapter also contributes to the literature on domestic armed conflict by exploring the role of state
repression (which has largely been overlooked) in increasing the risk of domestic armed conflict.
This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islam and
political violence, and domestic armed conflict onset respectively. Next, I discuss my theory and
hypotheses. Then, I summarize data, methods, and my research design, which will be used to test
the derived hypotheses. I discuss empirical findings in the fourth section. Lastly, implications of
these findings and some suggestions for future research are provided in the concluding section.
C. Islam and Political Violence
Despite historical evidence to the contrary, Islam is commonly associated with violence and
terrorism by the US media and some scholars. Muslims have historically been mostly peaceful
and tolerant. Just two decades ago, secular and nationalist ideologies were far more popular than
religious ones in the Middle East and suicide terror in the name of jihad was very rare (Mousseau
2011). Yet, some scholars argue that the core principles of Islam include intolerant views toward
nonbelievers and that Islam is inherently violence-prone. The scholars who attribute conflict
proneness of Muslims to Islam largely rely on the concept of jihad and some selective verses
from the Koran to support their arguments (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance,
6

Muslim-plurality states are defined as countries in which Islam is the most commonly practiced religion.
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Laquer (2003) argues that violence is blessed in Islam if it is carried out against infidels
(nonbelievers) and there is no room for them in the Islamic faith. Similarly, Pipes (2003) claims
that the violence-proneness of Muslims stems from the very nature of Islam: the obligation of
jihad. Jihad is an Arabic word which literally means “struggle” and it is translated as “holy war”
by Pipes.
However, this highly controversial concept of “Jihad” can be interpreted in different
ways; a small minority of fundamentalist Muslims think jihad justifies physical violence against
“infidels” whereas the vast majority regard it as an internal struggle to be a morally better person
(e.g., by fighting off immoral desires). Roy (2004) notes that jihadist Islam is a product of
sociological changes. Traditionally, jihad was understood as a collective, defensive duty, but
modern radicals view it as an individual permanent duty to fight against the West. Islam is also
portrayed as a totalitarian and politically oriented religion (Zaidise et al 2007). Islam has not
undergone a reformation like Christianity, which separated the religious and political spheres;
religiously oriented violence is attributed to the lack of secular state systems in the Muslim world
(Appleby 2000; Toft 2007).
Toft (2007) argues that in Abrahamic traditions violent conflict is regarded as a
manifestation of God’s will. These traditions tend to be uncompromising and encourage people
to sacrifice in this world (for eternal reward in the afterlife) to defend their faith. Thus, the
indivisibility of religious doctrines and the promise of martyrdom render bargaining and
deterrence useless. Radical Islamic groups promise spiritual incentives (paradise) to individuals;
therefore, high-cost activities in the present life become rational since the future benefits exceed
the costs (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006). All in all, even though these scholars do not
necessarily differentiate Muslim-majority states’ tendency to engage in inter-state or intra-state
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conflicts, they generally characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict-prone
and attribute this to Islam. However, the Muslim world is very diverse; there is no unique Islam
practiced by all Muslims in the world. These cleavages within Islam prevent to treat Islam as a
single monolithic entity and draw a conclusion regarding Islam’s role in promoting conflict.
Extremists, who refer to some selective religious doctrines to justify use of violence, exist in all
religions.
As mentioned above, there are only a few empirical studies that examine the link between
Islam and domestic armed conflict. Sorli et. al (2005) observe that Islam is not a significant
factor in driving civil war once they control for other explanatory factors such as economic
development, oil dependency, ethnic diversity etc. Similarly, Fish et al. (2010) examine Islam’s
conflict proneness by analyzing episodes of large scale political violence that occurred during
1946-2007. They observe that there is no significant correlation between the Muslim proportion
living in a country and the number of deaths in political violence episodes. The authors also
examine whether radical Islamism as an ideology, rather than the Islamic faith, is associated with
political violence. They rely on press reports and secondary sources to code conflicts instigated
by Islamists. The findings indicate that Islamist ideology is involved in eleven percent of total
episodes and accounted for sixteen percent of total deaths. Even though one may conclude that
the episodes involving Islamists seem to account for a disproportionate amount of deaths, Fish et
al. note that some episodes were instigated by both Islamist and other actors who bear joint
responsibility.
On the other hand, Toft (2007) finds that in forty-two religious civil wars from 1940 to
2000, eighty one percent had either incumbent governments or rebels identified with Islam. In
fifty eight percent of religious civil wars, Islam was the dominant religion. Toft explains Islam’s
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overrepresentation in civil wars with historical (lack of Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of
Westphalia in Islam), geographic (proximity of Israel, oil reserves, and Islam’s holiest sites), and
particularly ideological (jihad) factors. Toft notes that the destructiveness of the Thirty Years’
War and the following Enlightenment period decreased the power of religious authorities and
resulted in the development of the modern secular state system in Europe. In contrast, the Islamic
world has not experienced its own Thirty Years’ War, which may have enabled a continued role
of religion in politics. The geographic proximity of oil reserves and Islam’s holiest sites, Western
industrial states’ interest in the Middle East, and colonial experience also contributed to the rise
of Islamic identity and radicalization. Lastly, Toft emphasizes the concept of jihad to explain the
prevalence of civil wars in the Muslim world and argues that violence is justified in Islam to
defend the faith from unbelievers. Toft provides some historical examples to support her
argument, such as Muslim fighters who arrived from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to help the
Afghan mujahedeen combat Soviet invasion in 1979.
However, Toft’s (2007) findings suffer from several methodological weaknesses. First,
Toft bases her conclusions on mere descriptive statistics, which prevents drawing any inferences
about the drivers of civil war. Second, the author does not attempt to address the possibility of
spurious relationships through the use of a multivariate statistical model. Toft only looks at mere
percentages of civil wars in which Islam is somehow involved. Also, Toft provides insufficient
information about the coding of religious civil wars, particularly those that are associated with
Islam. Toft (2007:112-113) provides detailed information about the criteria to be coded as a civil
war but does not provide any explanation about the coding of “religious civil wars” or civil wars
in which Islam is involved. For example, Toft states that “of the forty two religious civil wars
fought from 1940 to 2000, one or both parties adhered to Islam in a striking thirty four cases and
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thirty four of the civil wars had an Islamic component” (2007:113). Toft does not explain what
exactly “adherence to Islam” or “Islamic component” means.
In a recent study, Fox (2007) tests Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and finds
partial support for Huntington’s argument about Islam’s conflict-proneness. Fox uses the State
Failure dataset to operationalize domestic conflicts between 1960 and 2004. Fox examines both
intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts in which at least one party invokes religion. Fox
(2007) finds that, while the Islamic civilization is found to be more conflict-prone, the majority
of conflicts involving Islamic countries is with other Muslim-majority states (not with other
civilizations). Fox also observes that beginning in 2002, religious conflicts became a majority of
all conflicts. However, Fox’s study suffers from oversimplification and failure to control for war
onset factors. Fox relies on comparative analysis of proportion of state failures in Muslimmajority and other countries.
In sum, there is some evidence that domestic armed conflicts are more common among
Muslim-majority states compared to other countries. Yet, it is not possible to draw a causal
relationship between Islam and the risk of domestic conflict without controlling for the correlates
of domestic armed conflict. Muslim-majority states’ domestic conflict-proneness is explained by
a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere descriptive statistics. I
argue that a more systematic analysis is necessary to investigate other potential explanatory
factors that account for Muslim majority states’ involvement in intra-state conflicts. Below, I
review the literature on domestic armed conflict onset which may help to explain the
disproportional involvement of Muslim-majority countries in domestic conflicts.
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Correlates of Domestic Armed Conflict
There are numerous quantitative studies that examine factors that increase the risk of domestic
armed conflict. Even though different scholars use different sets of variables and sometimes
disagree on how to operationalize similar concepts or provide different interpretations of similar
findings, at least some factors are found to be robustly correlated with domestic armed conflict
onset. Economic factors, the resource curse, demography, geographic and environmental factors,
ethnic and religious diversity, conflict history, government type and regime change are among
the commonly tested concepts which are deemed to impact risk of domestic conflict (Dixon
2009). Among hundreds of variables used to proxy some of the concepts mentioned above,
population, GDP per capita, economic growth, democracy, political instability, small military
capacity, rough terrain, war-prone neighbors, and oil dependence are found to be significantly
correlated to domestic armed conflict and robust to sensitivity checks (Dixon 2009; Hegre and
Sambanis 2006).
Economic factors, which are generally operationalized by GDP per capita or annual GDP
per capita growth rate, are among the few variables which are robustly correlated with domestic
armed conflict onset. Yet, GDP per capita is a very broad concept which can be interpreted in
different ways. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use GDP per capita to measure the
opportunity cost of rebellion, whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) use the same variable to measure
state capacity. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that countries with low GDP per capita would
be characterized by low state capacities or low opportunity cost of rebellion. Regardless of the
way economic factors are interpreted, it is safe to conclude that poor countries are more prone to
intra-state conflicts.
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Oil-dependence, or natural resource dependence, is another economic factor which
increases the risk of domestic armed conflict. Oil rents make leaders less dependent on tax
revenues, which create weak state institutions. Weak institutions in turn increase the feasibility
of rebellion (Fjelde 2009). Fearon (2005) argues that oil producers generally have low state
capabilities, and therefore are more prone to conflict, whereas Ross (2006) claims that oil and
other minerals increase the risk of conﬂict because they make independence more desirable for
resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence of natural resources
creates opportunities to rebel. Natural resource dependent economies may also make countries
more conflict prone by increasing the probability of trade shocks (Humphreys 2005). On the
other hand, oil money can also be used to co-opt potential dissidents, especially in politically
corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). Hegre and Sambanis
(2006)’s sensitivity analysis suggests that oil dependence is marginally robust whereas natural
resource dependence is not robust. The relative robustness of oil dependence compared to natural
resource dependence is a theoretical puzzle that can be explored by future studies. One potential
reason could be missing data and measurement errors. Ross (2006:265) notes that the studies that
examine the link between natural resource wealth and civil war suffer from measurement error,
endogeneity problems, lack of robustness, shortage of data, and uncertainty about causal
mechanisms.
The demographic and geographic characteristics of a country also affect the likelihood of
domestic armed conflict; conditions that favor insurgency, such as total population, youth bulges,
and mountainous terrain make countries more conflict-prone. It is hard to control people and
deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Indeed, population is one of the variables that
robustly and positively correlates with domestic armed conflict. Similarly, the existence of
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mountainous terrain makes it easier for rebel groups to hide from government and it is robust to
sensitivity analyses (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The existence of a youth bulge also increases
the risk of domestic conflict. There is historical evidence that violent outbreaks are correlated
with the proportion of a society’s young male population. Young people tend to be more
violence-prone compared with adults, because they tend to be more risk-acceptant and they are
not fully aware of the consequences of their actions and (Fuller 2003). The existence of a youth
bulge increases both grievances (especially when coupled with poverty, unemployment, and
repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel recruits (Urdal 2006).
The role of ethnic or religious diversity in promoting domestic conflict is debated by
many scholars. Theoretically, ethnic and religious differences are likely to be sources of
grievances and therefore increase the risk of intra-state conflict. Empirically, existing studies
provide contradictory findings. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that greater social
fractionalization (both ethnic and religious) actually reduces the risk of conflict. Hegre and
Sambanis (2006) show that ethnic fractionalization is robustly associated with the risk of
domestic conflicts, in which 25 battle deaths is used as a threshold to code conflicts, whereas it is
insignificant in civil wars which has at least 1.000 battle deaths. As far as religious diversity is
concerned, the findings are again inconclusive. De Soysa (2002) finds that religious homogeneity
increases the risk of civil war whereas religious heterogeneity decreases it. On the other hand,
Reynal-Querol’s (2002) analysis of ethnic civil wars indicates that religious polarization
increases the risk of ethnic conflicts. Lastly, Fearon and Latin (2003) find no significant
relationship between civil war and religious fractionalization between 1945 and 1999.
Regime type is another important factor which affects the risk of domestic armed conflict.
Semi-democracies are deemed to be more conflict-prone since they are characterized by
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insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient openness to induce substitution to
nonviolent tactics (Hegre at al 2001). Both Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Dixon’s (2009)
analyses confirm that anocracy and institutional inconsistency (change in polity score prior to the
civil war) are robustly associated with the risk of civil war.
Finally, more recent studies explore some new concepts which are ignored in the
previous research, such as state repression (Jakobsen and De Soysa 2009; Young 2012), different
dimensions of state capacity (Fjelde and Soysa 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010), political
corruption (Fjelde 2009) or focus on developing better measures of existing concepts. Gleditsch
and Ruggeri (2010) argue that Polity scores or GDP per capita are poor indicators of state
strength and offer an alternative variable: irregular leader changes, which occur through a
military coup or violent takeover of the government, to measure state weakness. The authors find
that irregular regime transitions indeed increase the risk of domestic conflict. Fjelde and Soysa
(2009) examine impact of state capacity and categorize state capacity into three types: coercion,
co-optation, and cooperation. Their findings indicate that high government spending (co-optation)
and trustworthy institutions (cooperation) can better reduce the risk of conflict than coercive
state capacities. Jakobsen and De Soysa (2009) find that state repression in ethnically
fractionalized states negatively affects the likelihood of civil war, whereas it increases the risk of
domestic conflict in ethnically homogenous states. Young (2012) finds that poor and repressive
regimes are particularly more prone to conflict. Fjelde (2009) finds that while both oil and
corruption alone increase the risk of civil war, the interaction of oil and political corruption
actually decreases the risk of civil war, which suggests that oil dependency can play a pacifying
role in politically corrupt regimes through co-opting potential dissidents.
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In sum, the literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there are numerous
factors which have the potential to increase the risk of domestic conflicts and there is no “right”
set of variables which should be included in a domestic armed conflict onset model. Nevertheless,
thanks to the development of more sophisticated statistical models and new data collection,
considerable progress has been made in understanding the causes and correlates of domestic
armed conflict.
Returning to the relationship between Islam and intra-state conflict, how do these
potential factors that increase the risk of domestic conflict operate in the Muslim world and to
what extent are these factors seen among Muslim-plurality countries? Also, can we explain the
prevalence of domestic conflict with these commonly cited correlates of domestic armed conflict
or is there another causal mechanism that might be driving insurgency in the Muslim world? In
other words, is there an “Islamic exceptionalism”? These questions still remain underexplored. A
more systematic and empirical analysis is required to examine the relationship between Islam
and the risk of intra-state conflict. To do so, I rely on another body of literature that focuses on
the underlying causes of radicalization and violence in the Muslim world. In the next section, I
review the literature on radicalization and violence in the Muslim world and synthesize it with
the domestic armed conflict onset literature from which I derive my testable hypotheses.
D. Theory and Hypothesis
Most of the research about Islamic activism is either descriptive or focuses on the unique
ideological orientation of Islam and thus perpetuates “Islamic exceptionalism” (Wiktorowicz
2004). Since 9/11, emphasizing Islamic culture in explaining many failures in the Muslim world
without proper research and evidence has become a common trend in many fields (Roy 2004). In
this chapter, I empirically test competing arguments proposed by scholars to explain domestic
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violence in the Muslim world. According to the literature on radicalization and violence in the
Muslim world, the prevalent causal factors of religious violence can be categorized into cultural
explanations, relative deprivation, political opportunity structures, existence of rentier states and
youth bulges.
According to cultural-identity based explanations, Islamists adhere to radical religious
identities as a response to cultural imperialism, colonial history, and the growing influence of
Western culture. These cultural arguments frame Islamic identity as violence-prone and
emphasize the salience of religious-cultural norms among Muslims (Ashour 2009). It is argued
that the failure of secular and liberal ideologies in the Muslim world also contributes to the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism (Appleby 2000; Toft 2007). Yet, identity does not always determine
political behavior. Surveys show that there is no significant correlation between personal piety
and political attitudes (Tessler 2003). Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that religious orientations
do not seem to affect approval of terrorism among people living in Jordan and Algeria.
Unfortunately, it is hard to operationalize concepts such as radical Islamic identity. Due to
limitations in data availability, I proxy Islamic identity with the most commonly practiced
religion practiced in a country and the proportion of Muslims living in a country. I test the
political culture approach with the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Muslim-plurality states are more likely to have domestic armed conflict
than non-Muslim states, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 1b: The risk of domestic armed conflict increases with an increase in the
proportion of Muslims within a state, ceteris paribus.
Social, economic, and political grievances and a growing sense of relative deprivation
are commonly cited reasons for religious violence (Ansari 1984; Appleby 2000; Canetti et al
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2010; Hafez 2003)7. The relative deprivation hypothesis was originally proposed by Tedd Gurr’s
(1970) theory of conflict behavior. The role of grievances in increasing the risk of domestic
armed conflicts is also much debated in the literature on civil war. Further, some scholars argue
that grievances such as high inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic and religious divisions are
the root causes of civil war, whereas others contend that greed− the existence of an opportunity
to rebel (e.g., natural resources) − plays a more important role in civil war onset (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al 2009; De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Ansari (1984) argues that Islamist militancy is a product of rapid urbanization and rural
migration. Studies show that militant Islamists tend to come from common backgrounds:
educated students and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle
class, recent migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. Canetti et al. (2010) also observe
the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence. The authors use individual
surveys conducted among Muslims and Jews living in Israel to explore the relationship between
support for political violence and religious affiliation. Muslims are found to be more supportive
of political violence in general. However, Jews become more supportive of political violence
once they control for objective and subjective deprivation by using a structural equation model.
Although limited in scope, the findings indicate that objective and perceived deprivation
mediates between religious affiliation and support for political violence. Mousseau (2011) finds
that approval of Islamist terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, poverty or
income dissatisfaction, but rather with urban poverty. If the relative deprivation hypothesis is
correct, then, socio-economic grievances should be more prevalent among Muslim-plurality
states and the risk of domestic conflict should increase with increasing grievances. The above
discussion leads to one more testable conjecture.
7

Mass media increased awareness of inequalities and grievances
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Hypothesis 2: The risk of domestic armed conflict in a state increases with increasing
socio-economic grievances.
Hafez (2003) contends that non-militant movements also emerged under unfavorable
socio-economic conditions and not all Muslim societies experience Muslim rebellion. He argues
that the Muslim rebel is not the result of economic deprivation or psychological alienation
produced by failed modernization but a response to indiscriminate state repression and
institutional exclusion. Hafez criticizes socioeconomic and psychological approaches for
ignoring the resources required to mobilize and for simplistic assumption that a certain level of
discontent almost automatically generates rebellion. Moreover, the relative deprivation
hypothesis ignores the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek reforms by lobbying,
petitioning, and forming political parties. To rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent
action is the only option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming
grievances into militant action. Hafez (2003:19) proposes a “political process approach” to
Islamist rebellions. This approach considers the political environment in which Islamists operate,
the mobilization structures by which resources are acquired and allocated, and ideological frames
with which Islamists justify collective action. It is argued that while exclusive and repressive
regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes decrease the probability of Islamist violence.
Hafez’s (2003) political process approach resembles the feasibility hypothesis in the civil war
onset literature, which focuses on factors that increase the feasibility of rebellion (Collier et al
2009).
State repression, which is an important factor in determining the choice of violent or nonviolent strategies by dissidents, has largely been ignored in the civil war onset literature (Young
2012). Repression has the potential both to increase and decrease the risk of domestic conflict.
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On the one hand, repression can increase the cost of collective action and deter rebellion. On the
other hand, repression can also increase grievances and the risk of conflict. Hafez (2003) argues
that the timing and nature of repression matters; selective and preemptive repression is likely to
deter rebellion, whereas indiscriminate repression and institutional exclusion breeds more
violence. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in
democracies,

whereas

there

is

a

curvilinear

relationship

between

repression

and

violent/nonviolent protests in non-democracies. Gurr (1970) also argues that there is a
curvilinear relationship between repression and rebellion. I expect to find an inverted-U shaped
relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict. Repression initially increases
domestic violence since grievances increase with more repression. However, extremely high
levels of repression should decrease the risk of conflict since the costs of collective action will be
greater in highly repressive states.
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted-U shaped relationship between state repression and
the probability of domestic armed conflict.
Going back to the political process approach proposed by Hafez (2003), there are other
political opportunities and constraints (in addition to state repression) which also affect the
likelihood of domestic conflict. A higher proportion of young males, which increases the number
of potential dissidents as well as grievances when coupled with unemployment and poverty, also
make countries more vulnerable to domestic conflict (Urdal 2006). Finally, rebel groups need
both financial and human resources to mobilize and to rebel against a government. Oil-dependent
or natural resource-dependent economies are also associated with a higher risk of domestic
armed conflict. Indeed, the majority of Muslim states have repressive authoritarian governments,
oil dependent economies, and an increasing youth population that is plagued with high rates of
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unemployment. For example, the Middle East, which is predominantly Muslim, has the highest
rate of unemployment in the world: 15 million as of 2011. According to a report by the
International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, youth (ages 15-24)
unemployment rate in the Middle East is 25.1 % compared to 12.6 % in the world as of 20108.
Middle Eastern countries have rich oil supplies as well. Six Gulf countries −Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE− sit on nearly 500 billion barrels of crude oil and 41.5
trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves (Harrigan and El-Said 2011). The coexistence of all
of these factors creates a political environment that is very vulnerable to domestic conflict. The
following hypothesis will test the political process approach:
Hypothesis 4: The risk of domestic armed conflict increases if there is a rentier state and
a growing youth population in a state.
E. Data, Methods, and Research Design
This section describes the data, methods, and research design that I use to test the hypotheses
derived in the previous section. I examine causal factors that increase a country’s probability of
experiencing domestic armed conflict. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all
the states in the international system, is used to test the hypotheses above. First, I compare the
prevalence of domestic armed conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality
countries to other countries by using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic
armed conflict onset model and conduct logistic regression analysis.
The dependent variable is domestic armed conflict onset and the unit of analysis is the
country-year. Since reliable data are rarely available during ongoing wars, using conflict onset
rather than conflict prevalence is preferred. Following Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ongoing
conflict years are dropped for the purpose of not conflating domestic armed conflict initiation
8
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and duration. I utilize Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s recent data collected by
Harbom and Wallensteen (2010) and Gleditsch et al (2002) which covers all domestic armed
conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2009. The onset dataset contains annual observations
of 172 states in the international system, as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Even though
the data on domestic armed conflict onset are available starting from 1945, it is hard to find
reliable data about socio-economic indicators before 1980. Data on oil production starts from
1970 whereas CIRI integrity data, which measure state repression, begin in 1981. Given these
data limitations, I analyze the period from 1981 to 2009.
The UCDP/PRIO conflict data defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility
which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties,
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”
(Gledistch et al. 2002: 618). In total, there are 163 domestic armed conflict onsets out of 4,079
country-year observations, or 4% of all country-year observations. The working sample consists
of only about 3.000 country-year observations due to the missing data on several explanatory
variables. All 172 countries in the international system are included in the analysis.
Independent Variables
The main explanatory variables included in the analyses below include: Muslim-plurality
country, Muslim proportion of the total population, GDP per capita, The Cingranelli-Richards
(CIRI) integrity score, oil rents, natural resource rents, and the proportion of young males (ages
between 15-24) in a society. The Muslim-plurality variable is a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 for countries in which Islamic faith is practiced by a plurality of the population. This
variable comes from Jonathan Fox’s (2004) Religion and State (RAS) project. I also use the
proportion of Muslims living in a country to assess the robustness of the relationship between
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Islam and political violence. Data on the proportion of Muslims living in a country are taken
from Kuru (2011). Kuru (2011) collected these demographic data from the International
Religious Freedom Reports, the CIA World Factbook, and the US Department of State's country
analysis reports. GDP per capita intends to proxy economic grievance (lower values indicates
less development and hence more grievances). Purchasing power parity converted GDP per
capita (constant in 2005 international dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables.
Unemployment rates and education data may better capture the existence of economic
grievances, but these data have many more missing observations. In fact, more than 50% of the
observations of these two variables are missing in the World Bank data. I utilize the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) data to measure state repression. The Physical Integrity Rights Index is an
additive index constructed from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and
disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full
government respect for these four rights). I rescale the CIRI scores from 1 to 9 in which higher
values indicate less government respect of human rights and more repression to make
interpretation easier. I also include a squared term of repression to capture the hypothesized
curvilinear relationship between state repression and conflict onset. Natural resource and oil
dependence data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Natural resource
dependence measures the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral
rents, and forest rents as a percentage of GDP. Oil rents are the difference between the value of
crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production as a percentage of GDP.
Finally, the data on the proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult
male population (15+) come from the UN’s World Population Prospects data.
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I also include the following control variables, which are expected to increase the risk of
domestic conflict (based on the findings of previous studies): ethnic fractionalization and
religious fractionalization, a dummy for transitionary regimes, percentage of mountainous
terrain, and total population. I use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for
regime type. Previous research suggests that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between
regime type and domestic armed conflict onset and transitionary regimes are more conflict prone
(Hegre et al. 2001) I create a dummy variable to operationalize transitionary regimes; the
countries that have polity 2 score between -5 and +5 are coded as anocracies. Ethnic and
religious fractionalization data come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). I extrapolate the data for
years after 2000. Both ethnic and religious fractionalization in a society hardly change over time.
The ethnic fractionalization index gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in
a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. Similarly, the religious fractionalization
index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are from
different religions. Lastly, I use the natural log of GDP per capita, percentage of mountainous
terrain, and the population. The variables GDP per capita and repression are lagged one year to
avoid problems in inferring causal direction. Table 2.1 summarizes the list of variables used in
the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized.
Table 2.1 about here
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use a logistic regression statistical
estimator to test my hypotheses, with robust standard errors clustered by country. Domestic
armed conflict is a rare event; King and Zeng (2001) point out that standard logistic regression
models might produce biased coefficient estimates when the proportion of zeroes to ones is very
low in the dependent variable. I use King and Zeng’s Relogit method to test whether the rare
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event issue can generate any significantly different outcomes in the analysis. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity which typically exists in a time-series-cross-sectional data set, I
employ a random effect model as well. To address the problem of temporal dependence— the
fact that for a given country, many observations over time are statistically related— I follow the
advice of Carter and Signorino (2010) by adding number of peace years since the last conflict,
peace years squared, and a cubic term of peace years to each model. Carter and Signorino
(2010) argue that polynomial approximation is less complex and easier to interpret than using
natural cubic splines suggested by Beck et al (1998). Finally, I report the pairwise correlations of
the independent variables to assess multicollinearity. The correlation matrices are included in
Table 2.5 in the Appendix 19.
F. Findings
If we only look at the proportion of Muslim-plurality countries and the proportion of
domestic armed conflicts, Islam plurality states are indeed more conflict-prone. Sixty two of 163
intra-state conflicts (38%) occurred in Muslim-plurality states, whereas 26.5 % of all states have
Muslim-plurality population. Six percent of Muslim-plurality states and 4% of all countries
experienced intra-state conflict respectively. Yet, a closer look at some of the explanatory
variables that increase the risk of domestic conflict suggest that Muslim-plurality countries are
also associated with lower levels of life expectancy, lower GDP per capita, oil-dependent
economies, higher proportion of young males, more state repression and autocratic governments.
9

There is a high correlation between GDP per capita and youth bulges (-.76) which leads to some concern about
multicollinearity in the model. Unfortunately, there is no statistical method to overcome the multicollineaity
problem. As Arceneaux and Huber (2007) notes, dropping one of the collinear variables from the model can bias
coefficient estimates whereas multicollinearity only makes estimates less precise. Moreover, the youth bulge
variable remains insignificant when I drop GDP per capita from Models 4, 5, and 6. Similarly, the impact of GDP
per capita does not change when youth bulge is dropped from Models 4, 5, and 6. The findings do not change when
GDP per capita is dropped from Model 7 whereas Islam-youth interaction loses significance when GDP per capita is
dropped from Model 8. I decided to keep both GDP per capita and youth bulges in the regression models since
dropping one of the collinear variables might lead to ommitted variable bias which is deemed to be more severe than
imprecision in the standard error of a coefficient.
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The median GDP per capita in Muslim-plurality states is $2,761, whereas it is an average of
$7,011 for other countries and an average of $5,537 for the world. Similarly, median life
expectancy in Muslim-plurality states is 65.6 compared to an average of 70.1 in other countries.
The median polity score in Muslim-plurality states is only -6 compared to +7 in other countries.
On average, oil rents constitute 14.9% of GDP in Muslim-plurality states whereas only 0.025%
of GDP comes from oil rents in other countries. The proportion of young males is 21% higher in
Muslim-plurality states compared to other countries whereas the CIRI integrity score is 20%
lower (which indicates that Muslim-plurality states more often have repressive regimes). Table
2.2 compares descriptive statistics of Muslim-plurality countries to non-Islamic countries. Given
the lower levels of GDP per capita, lower life expectancy, a lack of democracy, more repressive
regimes, higher proportion of young males, and oil or natural resource dependent economies, it is
not surprising to find higher rates of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality countries. The
comparison of main explanatory variables in Muslim-plurality states and other states provide
suggests that both grievances−which motivate rebellion−, and natural resources, and human
resources−which provide opportunity to rebel− are more prevalent in the Muslim world.
Table 2.2 about here
In order to better explore role of religion in domestic armed conflict onset, I first estimate
several bivariate regressions. Then, I specify a more complete theoretical model and examine
several interactions. In Model 1, I regress domestic armed conflict onset on Islam and include
only peace years, and its polynomial combinations to control for temporal dependence. Islam is
positive and significant which provides support for Hypothesis 1 if we overlook other factors that
make countries more conflict-prone. However, the statistical significance of the Islam dummy
disappears when repression and its squared term are added to the regression in Model 2.
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Repression is positive and significant whereas the squared term is negative and significant which
confirms the curvilinear relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict onset. In
Model 3, I drop the repression and add oil dependence to the regression. Similarly, the Islam
dummy becomes insignificant when oil dependence is controlled for even though oil dependence
alone is not significant either. The bivariate regression results suggest that the Islamic faith alone
does not make countries more conflict prone once we control for even just one other variable that
increases the risk of conflict. Table 2.3 shows the results of these regressions.
Table 2.3 about here
In Model 4, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model to explore the role
of Islam in promoting conflict once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. I
include ethnic fractionalization, oil rents, logged GDP per capita, repression and its squared
term, proportion of young males, a dummy for anocracies, a Muslim-plurality dummy, and the
percentage of mountainous terrain. Ethnic fractionalization, population, anocracy, and oil rents
significantly increase the risk of domestic armed conflict whereas religious fractionalization and
Muslim-plurality are negative but insignificant. Repression is positive and significant whereas its
squared term is negative and significant, which confirms the curvilinear relationship between
state repression and domestic armed conflict. The graph in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship
between the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict and repression 10 . This finding
supports Hypothesis 3; repression initially increases the risk of domestic armed conflict due to
increasing grievances but extreme levels of repression decreases the risk of conflict since
collective action becomes very costly and hence rebel groups are deterred. One potential critique
of the impact of repression could be the potential endogeneity problem; increasing repressive
10

I used the clarify program to calculate the predicted probabilities
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measures by a state may be part of the conflict rather than a cause of the conflict which later
escalates into domestic armed conflict. Yet similar arguments could be made for other correlates
of domestic armed conflict such as GDP per capita and regime type, which are commonly
included in domestic armed conflict onset models. I lagged the measure of repression one year to
mitigate this problem. As a robustness check, I also lagged the measure of repression for two
years and it remained statistically significant. Moreover, I drop ongoing conflict years and use
onset of domestic armed conflict as my dependent variable, which mitigates endogeneity
problems.
Figure 2.1 about here
Unlike previous studies, GDP per capita and youth bulge do not seem to affect the risk of
domestic armed conflict. States characterized by oil-dependent economies, repressive regimes,
transitionary political institutions, and ethnic diversity are more conflict-prone, whereas neither
Islam nor religious diversity has any significant effect. For a robustness test, I used both King
and Zeng (2001)’s Relogit procedure and a random effects model. The results did not change. I
also replaced the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion and the results again did not
change11. One can reasonably conclude that there is little support for Hypothesis 1.
In model 5, I drop oil rents and replace it with natural resource rents. Like oil rents,
natural resource rents also positively and significantly affect the likelihood of domestic armed
conflict onset. The anocracy variable loses significance whereas GDP per capita becomes
negative and significant. The number of observations increases by about 500 in this model (since
the variable oil rents has more missing data), which might be the reason for slightly different

11

These alternative model specifications are reported in the Appendix 1, Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8
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findings. Alternatively, inclusion of oil rents might be the reason for the insignificance of GDP
per capita in Model 4. Even though wealthier countries are expected to be less conflict-prone,
those countries with both high GDP per capita and highly oil-dependent economies might
actually still be vulnerable to domestic conflict. Islam is still insignificant and again, replacing
the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion does not change the results. In model 6, I
add a dummy variable for countries in which Christianity is the most commonly practiced
religion. Like Islam, Christianity is also insignificant.
Overall, these findings suggest that religious denomination alone does not necessarily
make countries more or less conflict-prone. State repression, which is previously ignored in
many studies, significantly affects the likelihood of domestic conflict, whereas the impact of
other variables is similar to previous studies. Even though Muslim-plurality countries are no
more conflict prone than others once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict,
one may wonder what may account for the higher proportion of domestic armed conflicts in the
Muslim world. In other words, what explains the variation in conflict-proneness of Muslimplurality countries specifically? To answer this question, I interact various explanatory variables
with Islam. The interactions of Islam dummy with all of the explanatory variables were all
insignificant except youth bulges-Islam interaction. In Model 7, I interact the proportion of
young males with the Muslim-plurality dummy. Muslim-plurality dummy becomes negative and
significant whereas the interaction of Muslim-plurality and young male proportion is positive
and significant. Interestingly, religious fractionalization is negative and significant in Model 7.
Unlike theoretical expectations, increasing religious heterogeneity seems to decrease the risk of
domestic armed conflict. Islam-youth interaction remains significant when I replace oil rents
with natural resource rents in Model 8. While youth bulges in general do not make countries
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more conflict prone, they do increase the risk of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality
countries. Yet, it is important to note that this finding is not robust to alternative model
specifications; Islam-youth interaction loses significance when I use a random-effects model or
when the Islam dummy is replaced with proportion of Muslims living in a country. 12 These
findings are summarized in Table 2.4
Table 2.4 about here
The significance of Islam-youth interaction is a theoretical puzzle, which can be explored
by future research. Theoretically, youth bulges alone do not create problems in a society. Young
people usually become more prone to use of violence when they face unfavorable socioeconomic and political conditions such as unemployment, poverty, income inequality, repressive,
and autocratic regimes. I control for economic development with GDP per capita, which is a very
crude proxy variable. The existing cross-national data about unemployment or other socioeconomic indicators such as income inequality or education have many missing observations. In
addition to these potential explanations, young people are more exposed to the external world,
which increase grievances and perceptions of relative deprivation. Moreover, social media
networks such as Facebook and Twitter make it easier for young people to communicate with
each other, to spread their ideas, to mobilize and rebel against governments. Indeed, young
people played a crucial role during Arab Spring.
I also estimate the analysis by adding the interactions of Islam and GDP per capita, Islam
and oil, Islam and repression, Islam and anocracy, and Islam and ethnic fractionalization one at a
time to the model. None of the interactions were statistically significant. When I conduct the

12

These alternative model specifications are reported in Appendix, Table 2.6, Table 2.7 and Table 2.8

40

analysis for only Muslim-plurality countries, ethnic fractionalization, repression and youth bulge
are positive and significant whereas the squared term of repression is negative and significant.
Surprisingly, oil-dependence does not seem to make Muslim countries more conflict-prone even
though there is a high correlation between Muslim-plurality and oil rents (0.44), and oil in
general increases the risk of conflict.
Finally, I calculate predicted probabilities for domestic armed conflict onset to explore
the substantive effect of other explanatory variables using Model 813. Domestic armed conflict is
a rare event; the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict is only one percent when all
explanatory variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are set to 0. The risk of
domestic armed conflict increases by 240% (from 0.004 to 0.014) when repression shifts from
10th percentile to 90th percentile value while all explanatory variables are held at their mean
values and dummy variables are set to 0. Similarly, a shift in ethnic fractionalization from 10th to
90th percentile leads to 208% increase in the risk of domestic armed conflict. The substantive
impact of GDP per capita and natural resource dependence are relatively small; the risk of
domestic armed conflict decreases by 72% when logged GDP per capita shifts from 10th to 90th
percentile value whereas a shift from 10th to 90th percentile in natural resource dependence
leads to only a 34% increase in the risk of war. The probability of domestic armed conflict
increases by 224% when logged total population shifts from 10th percentile to 90th percentile
whereas a shift of log of percentage of mountainous terrain from 10th to 90th percentile leads to
90% increase in the probability of domestic armed conflict.

13

I use clarify program to calculate predicted probabilities.
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G. Conclusion
What explains variation in the prevalence of domestic armed conflicts in the Muslim world and
to which extent could religion play a role in fostering violence? In this chapter, I conduct a timeseries and cross-national analysis to find answers to preceding research questions. Several
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Most importantly, contrary to suggestions and
claims in the literature, religion by itself does not promote conflict; religious diversity is negative
and insignificant in all of the regressions. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent
in Muslim-plurality states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an
environment which is very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are
characterized by a higher proportion of youth bulges, more repressive regimes, oil dependent
economies, and lower GDP per capita. Religious denomination does not seem to make countries
more or less conflict prone once one controls for these socio-economic and political conditions.
Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with various explanatory variables
remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying different operationalization of
Islam –use of Muslim-plurality or Muslim proportion−, and alternative model specifications
(Random-effects model, logit and relogit). Third, state repression, which is overlooked in
previous studies, is significant in all of the models. Repression initially increases risk of conflict
due to increasing grievances, but extreme levels of repression actually decreases the risk of
conflict since rebel groups are deterred. Fourth, the insignificance of Islam*oil interaction or oil
rents when the analysis is run for only Muslim countries is puzzling; previous studies about the
causes of domestic armed conflict suggest that oil dependence increases the risk of conflict
(Fearon 2005; Ross 2012). Yet, oil dependence does not seem to increase the risk of conflict in
Muslim-plurality countries. Future research may focus on solving this puzzle. One potential
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explanation could be that leaders may use oil money to co-opt or contain potential dissidents and
thus prevent domestic conflicts as suggested by Fjelde (2009). Gause (2011) argues that
autocratic leaders in the Arab world successfully co-opted and contained mobilizations against
the governments until very recently. Finally, even though interactions of Islam with many
explanatory variables are insignificant, Islam-youth bulge interaction positively affects risk of
domestic conflict. Future studies may focus on exploring the causal mechanisms by which youth
bulges increases risk of domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. Some scholars argue that
youth bulges have played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; those
young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment,
rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). Future
research can test conditional impact of youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with
unemployment rate, and education. All in all, this chapter contributes to the literature by
exploring causal factors that increase risk of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality states as well
as in other states.
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Appendix 1: List of Tables

Table 2.1: Summary of Variables
Variable Name
Islam
Log of GDP per capita
Repression (rescaled CIRI score)
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Natural resource rents (% of GDP)
Muslim proportion
Anocracy
Youth bulge
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Log of total population
% of mountainous terrain

Concept
Dummy for countries in which Islam is the most commonly
practiced religion
Economic grievances
Political constraints (repression)
Rentier state status
Rentier state status
Religion
Political opportunity structure (control variable)
Human resources
Ethnic diversity (control variable)
Religious diversity(control variable)
Population(control variable)
Geographic factors(control variable)
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Table 2.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics in Muslim-plurality and Other Countries
Muslimplurality
Countries
GDP per
capita
Life
expectancy
CIRI integrity

Median St.dev.

2761.7

Min

16852.4 454.2

Max

Other
countries

Median

St.
dev.

159144.
5
77.9

GDP per
capita
Life exp.

7011.4

11814 136

89814

70.09

10.5

30.4

82.9

CIRI
integrity
Polity

6

2.01

0

8

7

7.02

-10

10

0.28

0.08

0.11

0.47

0.025

10.05

0

79.5

2.2

10.9

0

80.6

65.6

10.3

38.1

5

1.96

0

Polity

−6

5.4

-10

9

Prop. of
young males
Oil rents
(%of GDP)
Natural
resource
rents (% of
GDP)
Number of
domestic
armed
conflicts
Proportion
of Muslimplurality
countries

0.34

0.06

0.14

0.42

14.9

18.3

0

103.2

9.8

25.3

0

214.4

62
(38%)

26.5%

888

Prop. of
young males
Oil rents
(%of GDP)
Natural
resource
rents (% of
GDP)
Number of
domestic
armed
conflicts
Proportion
of other
countries
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101
(62%)

73.5%

Min

Max

Table 2.3 Bivariate Regressions

Variables
Islam

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

.463*
(.250)

.0456
(.290)
1.12***
(.281)
-0.081***
(.029)

.292
(.306)

Repression
Repression square
Oil rents
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
N

-.72***
(.160)
.066***
(.018)
-.0014***
(.000)
4079

-.44***
(.174)
.036**
(.017)
-.001**
(.000)
3443

.01
(.006)
-.741***
(.178)
.062***
(.019)
-.002***
(.000)
3071

Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***)
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).

53

Table 2.4: Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict (1981-2009)

Variables
Repression a
Repression squared a
GDP per capita a b
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Oil rents (% of GDP)

Model 4
.832**
(.377)
-.07*
(.038)
-.129
(.215)
2.27***
(.671)
-1.049
(.732)
.021**
(.008)

Natural resource rents (%
of GDP)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)
Islam

Model 5
.586*
(.302)
-.049
(.031)
-.353*
(.184)
1.545**
(.645)
-.663
(.702)

Model 6
.807**
(.372)
-.068*
(.038)
-.182
(.214)
2.30***
(.674)
-1.122
(.736)
.0212**
(.009)

.009*

-4.084
(3.247)
-.413
(.344)

(.005)
-1.792
(3.128)
-.024
(.317)

Christian

Population b
% of Mountainous terrain b
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3

N

.632**
(.320)
.373***
(.128)
.165*
(.103)
-.229
(.149)
.011
(.014)
-.000
(.000)
2497

.415
(.279)
.276**
(.110)
.155*
(.092)
-.259*
(.137)
.019
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Model 8
.641**
(.298)
-.054*
(.031)
-.390**
(.192)
1.606***
(.666)
-.689
(.681)

.010*

-4.232
(3.184)
-.234
(.434)

Islam*Youth bulge

Anocracy

Model 7
.895**
(.379)
-.0771**
(.039)
-.209
(.220)
2.36***
(.688)
-1.183*
(.730)
.020**
(.009)

.307
(.351)
.656**
(.322)
.399***
(.126)
.167
(.104)
-.231
(.147)
.011
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
2497

(.006)
-3.735
(3.239)
-3.983**
(1.995)
11.598**
(5.595)

-5.451*
(3.282)
-4.65**
(2.099)
13.205**
(6.109)
.297
(.354)
.605*
.394
(.321)
(.274)
.397***
.274**
(.130)
(.111)
.176*
.191**
(.102)
(.095)
-.228
-.248*
(.145)
(.138)
.010
.018
(.013)
(.013)
-.000
-.000
(.000)
(.000)
2497

3007

Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***)
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).
a: Lagged one year
b: Logged
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Table 2.5: Correlation of Independent Variables
Ethnic fr. Population GDP capitaYouth bulgePolity
Ethnic fr.
Population
GDP capita
Youth bulge
Polity
Natural res.
Relig. Fr.
Muslim prop.
Mount. Ter.
CIRI
Oil rents
Islam
Christian

1.00
-0.02
-0.38
0.45
-0.21
0.15
0.38
0.10
0.01
-0.24
0.10
0.02
-0.15

1.00
-0.08
-0.02
-0.08
-0.05
0.08
-0.05
0.16
-0.27
-0.04
-0.04
-0.18

1.00
-0.77
0.32
-0.07
0.06
-0.14
-0.14
0.54
0.01
-0.10
0.21

1.00
-0.44
0.24
-0.01
0.29
0.10
-0.53
0.19
0.25
-0.34

Natural res.Relig. Fr. Muslim prop.Mount. Ter.CIRI

1.00
-0.44
-0.04
-0.58
0.07
0.46
-0.45
-0.52
0.56
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1.00
0.03
0.41
-0.03
-0.23
0.82
0.42
-0.26

1.00
-0.12
-0.20
0.07
0.04
-0.14
0.03

1.00
0.04
-0.29
0.40
0.95
-0.70

1.00
-0.24
-0.08
0.03
0.00

1.00
-0.22
-0.27
0.33

Oil rents

1.00
0.42
-0.25

Table 2.6: Random-Effects Model
Variables
Islam

Model 4
-.412
(.353)

Model 5
-.012
(.364)

Model 6
-.234
(.434)

.832**
(.391)
-.07*
(.036)
-.129
(.2)
2.266***
(.675)
-1.105
(.825)
.021**
(.009)

.704**
(.331)
-.06*
(.032)
-.316
(.199)
1.753**
(.675)
-.48
(.855)

.808**
(.392)
-.068*
(.036)
-.181
(.214)
2.3***
(.683)
-1.122
(.84)
.021**
(.009)

Islam*Youth bulge
Repression a
Repression squared a
GDP per capita a b
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)

-4.082
(3.57)

.009
(.007)
-.132
(3.75)

.631**
(.314)
.373***
(.112)
.165
(.118)
-.229
(.149)
.01
(.015)
-.000
(.000)
2497

.416
(.281)
.35***
(.123)
.192*
(.116)
-.15
(.148)
.012
(.015)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Christian
Anocracy
Population b
% of Mountainous terrain b
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
N
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-4.232
(3.184)
.307
(.41)
.656**
(.316)
.399***
(.117)
.168
(.12)
-.231
(.149)
.011
(.015)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 7
-4.795
(3.5)
13.139
(10.33)
.922**
(.398)
-.079**
(.037)
-.157
(.206)
2.325***
(.676)
-1.113
(.826)
.020**
(.009)

-5.374
(3.654)
.296
.(415)
.582*
(.315)
.370***
(.112)
.172
(.117)
-.227
(.149)
.01
(.015)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 8
-4.25
(2.938)
12.44
(8.464)
.746**
(.33)
-.064**
(.032)
-.365*
(.2)
1.757***
(661)
-.509
(.84)

.011
(.006)
-2.4
(3.86)

.401
(.28)
.338***
(.12)
.224*
(.116)
-.151
(.146)
.011
(.0145)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Table 2.7: Relogit Model
Variables
Islam

Model 4
-.397
(.341)

Model 5
-.024
(.316)

Model 6
-.244
(.431)

.762**
(.376)
-.063*
(.037)
-.134
(.213)
2.162***
(.666)
-1.001
(.727)
.021**
(.008)

.542*
(.3)
-.044
(.03)
-.352*
(.183)
1.489**
(.642)
-.655
(.698)

.739**
(.37)
-.062*
(.037)
-.182
(.212)
2.197***
(.666)
-1.055
(.73)
.021**
(.008)

Islam*Youth bulge
Repression a
Repression squared a
GDP per capita a b
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)

-4.05
(3.227)

.009*
(.005)
-.1.868
(3.11)

.624**
(.318)
.362***
(.127)
.161
(.102)
-.204
(.147)
.07
(.014)
-.000
(.000)
2497

.414
(.277)
.271**
(.109)
.153*
(.09)
-.237*
(.136)
.016
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Christian
Anocracy
Population b
% of Mountainous terrain b
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
N
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-4.157
(3.163)
.274
(.348)
.645**
(.32)
.385***
(.125)
.162
(.1)
-.2
(.146)
.07
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 7
-4.325
(1.98)
11.877**
(5.859)
.849**
(.383)
-.072*
(.038)
-.159
(.219)
2.2***
(.68)
-1.061
(.723)
.020**
(.009)

-5.255
(3.32)
.254
(.351)
.596*
(.318)
.378***
(.129)
.168*
(.1)
-.202
(.144)
.07
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 8
-3.873
(1.984)
11.324**
(5.565)
.599**
(.297)
-.049*
(.03)
-.386**
(.19)
1.542**
(663)
-.672
(.677)

.011*
(.005)
-3.765
(3.222)

.392
(.273)
.268**
(.111)
.188**
(.094)
-.226*
(.136)
.015
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Table 2.8: Regressions with Muslim Proportion
Variables
Muslim prop.

Model 4
-.003
(.003)

Model 5
.000
(.003)

Model 6
.000
(.005)

.831**
(.384)
-.07*
(.039)
-.127
(.215)
2.245***
(.675)
-.954
(.772)
.019**
(.009)

.587*
(.302)
-.049
(.031)
-.349*
(.182)
1.524**
(.652)
-.613
(.694)

.793**
(.377)
-.067*
(.038)
-.203
(.214)
2.277***
(.679)
-1.072
(.732)
.019**
(.008)

Muslim*Youth bulge
Repression a
Repression squared a
GDP per capita a b
Ethnic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)

-4.288
(3.258)

.008
(.005)
-.1.838
(3.107)

.64**
(.323)
.353***
(.125)
.172*
(.103)
-.235
(.149)
.011
(.014)
-.000
(.000)
2497

.415
(.278)
.273***
(.105)
.156*
(.09)
-.259*
(.137)
.019
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Christian
Anocracy
Population b
% of Mountainous terrain b
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
N
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-4.451
(3.178)
.483
(.395)
.682**
(.327)
.402***
(.124)
.165
(.104)
-.235
(.148)
.011
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 7
-.027
(.024)
.085
(.073)
.858**
(.396)
-.074*
(.04)
-.217
(.217)
2.325***
(.685)
-1.067
(.723)
.02**
(.009)

-5.88*
(3.52)
.454
(.398)
.661**
(.326)
.394***
(.126)
.175*
(.103)
-.234
(.147)
.011
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
2497

Model 8
-.032
(.021)
.097
(.063)
.638**
(.31)
-.053*
(.031)
-.373**
(.186)
1.575**
(.671)
-.558
(.681)

.009*
(.005)
-3.931
(3.436)

.404
(.277)
.266**
(.107)
.185**
(.093)
-.252*
(.137)
.018
(.013)
-.000
(.000)
3007

Table 2.9: List of Domestic Armed Conflicts
Algeria

1991-2009

Ghana

Angola

1991-1993

Guinea

2000-2001 Liberia

1981

Lesotho

1989-1990 Russia (Soviet Union)

1993

Angola

1994-1997

Guinea-Bissau

1998-1999 Liberia

2000-2003 Russia (Soviet Union)

1994-1996

Angola

1998-2001

Haiti

1989

Macedonia

2001

Russia (Soviet Union)

Angola

2002

Haiti

2004

Malaysia

1981

Russia (Soviet Union)

2007-2009

Angola

2007

India

1982

Mali

1990

Rwanda

1990-1994

1994

Rwanda

1997-2002

Russia (Soviet Union)

1990-1991

1999-2006

Azerbaijan

1991

India

Azerbaijan

1993-1995

India

Azerbaijan

2005

India

Bosnia-Herzegovina

1992

India

1992

Moldova

Bosnia-Herzegovina

1993-1995

India

1993

Myanmar (Burma)

1987

India

1994

Myanmar (Burma)

1990

Somalia

2001-2002

1991-1992

India

1997-1999 Myanmar (Burma)

1991

Somalia

2006-2009

1992

South Africa

Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon

1983-1988 Mali

1998

1989

Mali

1990-1991 Mexico

2007-2009 Rwanda
1994

Senegal

1992

Sierra Leone

1987-1989 Somalia

2009
1990
1991-2000
1982-1984

1984

India

2000-2002 Myanmar (Burma)

Central African Republic

2001-2002

India

2003-2004 Myanmar (Burma)

Central African Republic

2006

India

2005-2007 Myanmar (Burma)

Central African Republic

2009

India

2008

Myanmar (Burma)

Chad

1997-2002

India

2009

Myanmar (Burma)

Chad

2005-2009

Indonesia

1981-1989 Myanmar (Burma)

Comoros

1989

Indonesia

1990-1991 Myanmar (Burma)

Comoros

1997

Indonesia

1992

Nepal

Congo

1993-1994

Indonesia

1997

Nicaragua

Congo

1997-1999

Indonesia

1999

Niger

Congo

2002

Iran

1986-1988 Niger

1994

Togo

Cote D'ivoire

2002-2004

Iran

1991-1992 Niger

1995

Trinidad and Tobago

Croatia

1992-1993

Iran

1993

Niger

1997

Turkey

1984-1990

Djibouti

1991-1994

Iran

1996

Niger

2007-2008 Turkey

1991-2004

Djibouti

1999

Iran

1997

Nigeria

2004

Turkey

Egypt

1993-1998

Iran

2005-2009 Nigeria

2009

United Kingdom

Eritrea

1997

Iraq

1982-1986 Pakistan

1990

Uzbekistan

Eritrea

1993-1994 Spain

1981-1988
1985-1987

1995

Spain

1991-1992

1996

Sri Lanka

1984-1988

1997-2003 Sri Lanka

1989-2001

2005-2008 Sudan

1983-2009

2009

Surinam

1996-2006 Tajikistan
1982

Thailand

1991-1992 The US

1987
1992-1996
2003-2009
2001
1986
1990

2005-2009
1998
1999-2000

2003

Iraq

1987-1990 Pakistan

1995-1996 Uzbekistan

2004

Ethiopia

1983-1992

Iraq

1991-1994 Pakistan

2004-2006 Venezuela

1982

Ethiopia

1994-1995

Iraq

1995-1996 Pakistan

2007-2009 Venezuela

Ethiopia

1996

Iraq

2004-2009 Panama

Ethiopia

1998

Israel

1990-1999 Papua New Guinea

Ethiopia

1999-2009

Israel

2000-2005 Paraguay
2006-2009 Peru

Gambia

1981

Israel

Georgia

1991

Kenya

Georgia

1992

Laos

1989-1990 Philippines

Georgia

2004

Lebanon

1982-1986 Rumania

Georgia

2008

Lebanon

1989-1990

1982

Peru

59

1989

Yemen

1989-1990 Yemen
1989

Yemen

1992
1986
1994
2009

1982-1999 Yugoslavia (Serbia)

1991

2007-2009 Yugoslavia (Serbia)

1998-1999

1993-2009 Zaire

1996-2001

1989

Zaire

2006

Zaire

2007

0

Probability of Intra-state Conflict
.01
.02

.03
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Figure 2.1: Repression and the Predicted Probability of Intra-state Conflict
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CHAPTER 3

Ethno-political Organizations in the Middle East: When Do They Opt for Violence?
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A. Abstract
Why do some ethno-political organizations resort to violence while others abstain from it?
Are ethno-political organizations with a religious/Islamist ideology more violence-prone
compared to non-religious ones? This chapter attempts to find answers to these questions
by analyzing ethno-political organizations in the Middle East. The factors that increase a
country’s risk of experiencing domestic armed conflicts are examined in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under
which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. I use the
Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which includes 118
organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa to test my hypotheses.
Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from the previous
chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that promote domestic armed
conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive states, and youth
bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political
organizations. Youth bulges foster violence especially in autocratic countries.
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B. Introduction
“Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history and
the existence of a “youth bulge” has historically been associated with times of political
crises” (Goldstone 2001:95)
“The Middle East is facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged fifteen to twenty-nine
comprise the largest proportion of the population. These young people, frustrated with the
lack of jobs, have been at the forefront of anti-government protests” (Assaad 2011, cited in
Hoffman and Jamal 2012:169)
In the previous chapter, I examined causal factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing
domestic armed conflict. This chapter builds on those analyses by focusing on factors that
increase the probability of violence at the group-level rather than country-level. I explore
conditions under which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their
goals. Kalyvas (2006) calls for studies that incorporate micro, meso and macro level data into a
coherent picture of violence within domestic armed conflicts and other irregular conflicts. This
dissertation aims to do so by building a bridge between the research on domestic armed conflicts,
contentious politics, social movements, and radicalization, and testing similar hypotheses at the
state and group levels. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from
the previous chapter, similar causal factors that promote domestic armed conflict such as socioeconomic grievances and the existence of repressive states are also used to explain the adoption
of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Therefore, I test similar hypotheses to the
ones examined in the previous chapter.
Ethno-political organizations are politically active communal groups. Gurr (1993:161)
defines communal groups as “cultural and religious identity groups that do not have recognized
states or institutionalized political status”. The review of the literature suggests that ethnopolitical organizations’ decision to use violence is influenced by the existence of grievances,
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political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology
of the organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of
youth bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethnopolitical organizations. Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend
to be likely recruits for violent organizations. I utilize the Minorities at Risk Organizational
Behavior (MAROB) dataset to test my hypotheses. The dataset includes 118 organizations in 16
countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004. The empirical
findings confirm that youth bulges, state repression, organizational fractionalization, external
support for the organization, and economic grievances positively affect adoption of violent
strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas an increasing GDP growth rate has a
pacifying impact. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are no
more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings of
the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than
religion drives the decision to resort to violence.
This chapter is organized as follows. First I review the literature on contentious politics,
social movements, and radicalization and derive testable hypothesis. Next, I describe the data,
methods, and the research design. Then, I discuss the empirical findings. Finally, I provide a
brief conclusion in which I discuss implications of these findings as well as the limitations of this
research.
C. Literature Review
While some ethno-political organizations prefer to use conventional means to advance their
interests such as participation in elections, others engage in either nonviolent protest or violent
resistance. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) use the concept ‘contentious politics’ to refer to both violent
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and nonviolent strategies used by organizations such as protest and rebellion. They define
contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s
interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs in which
governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly and Tarrow
2007:4). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent campaigns are actually more
successful than violent campaigns in achieving political goals. Yet, violence is regarded as a
viable option and used by many ethno-political organizations. Why do some ethno-political
organizations choose violence rather than conventional politics or protest, which is less risky,
less costly, and tends to be more successful in achieving political goals? What factors influence
ethno-political groups’ choice of violent vs nonviolent strategies? The review of the literature
suggests that there are five broad concepts, which affect decisions to use violent or nonviolent
strategies by ethno-political organizations: grievances, resource mobilization, political
opportunity structures, organizational structure, and the ideology of the organization. In addition
to these factors, I argue that ethno-political organizations, which are active in societies with a
large youth population, tend to be more violence-prone. Below, I first review these concepts and
point out the weaknesses of existing literature. Then, I explain how youth bulges may foster the
use of violence by ethno-political organizations and conclude this section with my testable
hypothesis.
Grievances
According to Gurr (1970)’s relative deprivation hypothesis, grievances, which stem from
inequalities− either subjective or objective−, lead to frustration and motivate collective violence.
In other words, the difference between the expectations of an individual and what the individual
actually possesses, leads to discontent and eventually incites violence. Globalization and ready
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access to information have increased awareness of inequalities, increased expectations, and
consequently deepened the feelings of frustration. Regan (2009) confirms that grievances that
stem from poverty, inequality, and discrimination lead to violence. Gurr (1993) argues that
grievances are especially critical in early stages of group mobilization but become less
significant once people are committed to collective action. In other words, leaders initially use
grievances to mobilize people for collective action and recruit potential rebels but once the
conflict process begins, it becomes a self-sustaining dynamic.
The literature on social movements also focuses on grievances and structural and
psychological causes of mass mobilization. It is argued that structural factors such as
modernization (rapid economic liberalization and industrialization) or economic crises disrupt
social life and create a sense of despair and anxiety which in turn makes joining social
movements attractive. Likewise, Islamic activism is explained by socio-psychological factors as
well as grievances; the popularity of Islamist movements is explained by a power vacuum, which
emerged due to the failure of autocratic regimes and secular modernization projects to promote
economic development (Ayoob 2005; Fox 2004; Moghadam 2009; Wiktorowicz 2004).
While the corrupt, authoritarian regimes in many Muslim countries fail to provide social
services, Islamists fill this vacuum through charity organizations. Islamist parties, which are very
popular in many Muslim countries, are regarded as being less corrupt than other parties. It is
argued that rapid structural and demographic dislocations during the postcolonial period also
contributed to a sense of relative deprivation and alienation. While literacy rates and education
increased, these educated new elites could not find employment or they were underemployed.
Moreover, the modernization process increased expectations among people (Hafez 2003). Ansari
(1984) argues that Islamist militancy is a product of rapid urbanization and rural migration.
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Studies show that militant Islamist tend to come from familiar backgrounds; educated students
and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle class, recent
migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. In addition to these domestic grievances,
globally, surveys show that Muslims are dissatisfied with the international status quo, especially
with the US foreign policy. The US support of Israel and the Iraq war in 2003 are among the
commonly cited political grievances (Ayoob 2005; Harrigan and El-Said 2011).
While social movement theory focuses on groups as the unit of analysis and provides
group level explanation of political violence, the literature on terrorism is insightful in providing
individual level explanations for radicalization and the decision to use violence. Even though
unfavorable socio-economic conditions, such as poverty and low levels of education, are
sometimes associated with terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Russel’s (1983)
findings suggest that poverty and lack of education do not necessarily lead to higher rates of
terrorism. Russel and Miller (1983) examine the profile of 350 terrorists from revolutionary
groups and find that the majority of these terrorists were in fact well educated and come from
middle or upper-middle classes. Therefore, inequalities and injustices are deemed to be more
influential than poverty in driving violent extremism (El-Said and Barret 2011).
Still, some scholars are skeptical about the impact of grievances in fostering violence;
they argue that such discontent exists in all societies (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Existing
studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of grievances in promoting violence. Gurr
(1993) observes that political grievances such as the historical loss of autonomy and differential
political status increase the probability of rebellion whereas severe political discrimination and
cultural grievances decrease it. Gurr and Moore (1997) find that grievances don’t have a direct
impact on rebellion but increase mobilization capacity of ethno-political organizations which in
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turn increases the risk of rebellion. Regan and Norton (2005) find that political discrimination
increases the risk of rebellion and civil war. Similarly, Cederman et al (2010) find that the
probability of ethnic conflict increases if leaders of an ethnic group are excluded from central
executive power or if they are underrepresented.
Resource Mobilization Theory
Resource mobilization theory, which is based on rational choice perspective, rose as a major
challenge to the relative deprivation approach (Brush 1996). The resource mobilization theory
emphasizes the ability of social movements to gain resources of power, to organize, to recruit
members, and to provide individual incentives or coercion in motivating participation in social
movement activities. According to resource mobilization theory, movements are rational,
organizational manifestations of collective action. Collective action depends on members’ shared
interests as well as organization and opportunities (Tilly 1978:55). The relative deprivation
approach is criticized for ignoring the resources required to mobilize and maintain insurgency
(Muller 1985).
Tilly (1969) argues that collective violence occurs when individuals believe that
collective action will be successful and the expected benefits exceed the costs rather than when
individuals have grievances. In other words, frustration is not sufficient for mobilization; groups
need resources to translate individual frustration into group mobilization. Grievances exist in all
societies and can easily be manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Hafez (2003) criticizes the relative deprivation hypothesis for
ignoring the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek to advance their interests
through the use of nonviolent strategies.
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Weinstein (2006) finds that rebel groups that emerge in natural resource rich regions or
those that have external support use higher levels of violence whereas movements that emerge in
poor nations use violence selectively. Dalton et al (2010) use the World Value Survey to test the
influence of relative deprivation and the availability of resources in driving protest. They find
that protest increases not because of increasing grievances such as dissatisfaction with
government, but because of the availability of resources. Similarly, Muller (1985) examines the
relationship between income inequality−which is used to measure grievances− and collective
political violence for the 1958-1977 periods and finds only a weak correlation between
inequality and the number of death stemming from political violence. Muller (1985) concludes
that discontent in general is weakly related to political violence whereas resources play a more
significant role.

In sum, it is argued that both external and internal resources, which facilitate

mobilization, are more crucial than grievances in driving collective violence (McCarthy and Zald
1977).
Political Process Approach
The political process approach, originally developed by McAdam (1982), could be regarded as a
modified version of resource mobilization theory. According to a political process approach,
collective action is limited by external opportunities and constraints. Therefore, the decision to
use violence by a group is influenced by the broader political context (Hafez 2003; McAdam
1982; Tarrow 1998; Wiktorowicz 2004). McAdam (1982) points out three important factors that
influence the organizations’ collective action: the level of organization within the group, the
group’s belief in the probability of success of collective action, and the political opportunities
available to achieve the goals. While “political process” is a very broad concept, which can be a
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catch-all term, the characteristics of the state and regime type are two key factors in shaping
opportunities and constraints for organizations or social movements.
In democratic and inclusive regimes, organizations have the option of participating in
elections or protest rather than rebellion to search for their rights. Therefore, they will be less
likely to adopt un-conventional, risky and violent strategies. On the other hand, exclusive and
repressive regimes legitimize the use of violence since conventional political participation is not
available (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that violent rebellion
is more likely to occur in low-capacity and non-democratic regimes. Similarly, Goodwin (2001)
examines revolutionary movements between 1945 and 1991 and concludes that revolutionary
movements do not occur just because of economic inequality but rather due to political
oppression. Goodwin argues that revolutions are most likely to occur in authoritarian, exclusive,
repressive, organizationally incoherent and militarily weak states. In other words, revolutions
occur when “there is no other way out” (Trotsky 1961; cited in Goodwin 2001:26).
State repression is another important factor in determining the choice of violent or nonviolent strategies by dissidents. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars regarding the impact
of repression in motivating violence. Regan and Norton (2005) find that repression decreases
protest but increases both rebellion and civil war. Lichbach (1987) argues that dissidents switch
between violent and nonviolent protest depending on the government response. If the
government responds to one type of protest with violence, the dissidents will switch to another
type. Lichbach also argues that consistent government accommodative or repressive policies
reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression
breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in democracies whereas there is a curvilinear
relationship between repression and violent/nonviolent protests in non-democracies. Gurr (1970)
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and Muller (1985) confirm that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and the
probability of rebellion.
Organizational Factors
While external factors such as state institutions, resources, and grievances are influential in
motivating adoption of violent strategies, internal factors such as organizational structure and
ideology are also important in promoting violence. Inter-group or intra-group competition and
group fractionalization foster violence (Borum 2011; Dalacoura 2011). According to the theory
of outbidding, competing groups tend to radicalize and resort to violence to increase their
support and to out-bid other groups (Bloom 2004; Lawrence 2010). Similarly, group
fractionalization and intra-group competition lead less-motivated members to leave the group
and thus increase group radicalization (Borum 2011).
Finally, the ideology of an organization has the potential to influence the decision to
resort to violence. Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that religious organizations tend to be more
violent since they believe that God is their primary audience and they see the enemy as evil. Toft
(2007) notes that violent conflict is regarded as a manifestation of God’s will in religious
traditions. Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence as
discussed in the previous chapter. If Islam is inherently prone to violence as argued by some
scholars, ethno-political organizations with an Islamist ideology should be more likely to behave
violently than others.
In sum, the review of the literature suggests that all of the concepts discussed above−
grievances, resources, political opportunities and constraints, ideology of the organization, and
organizational structure− have the potential to promote violence. Numerous studies have tested
the impact of these factors. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars about whether grievances
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or resources as well as political opportunities play a more important role in driving violence.
This chapter intends to shed light on these grievances versus resources debates by examining the
impact of grievances, resources, and political opportunities in motivating violence by ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter examines the role of youth
bulges in driving group-level violence, which has been ignored by existing studies. I argue that
the existence of large youth cohorts also increases the probability of adoption of violence by
ethno-political organizations since young people are more likely to be prone to violence.14
Youth bulges lead to competition and scarcity in labor markets and educational systems,
which in turn increases grievances and the potential for violence (Urdal 2004). Furthermore,
large youth cohorts provide an excellent human resource for violent organizations. The
opportunity cost of joining insurgency movements is usually lower for young people since they
have less to lose (Collier 2000). Thus, a youth bulge has the potential to increase both grievances
and available resources. Goldstone (2001) claims that youth population has historically been
associated with political violence. Goldstone (2001) contends that well-educated youth are
specifically more prone to political violence since they will have higher economic and political
expectations. Resorting to violence becomes very likely if these educated youth are unemployed
or underemployed and live in authoritarian countries in which conventional means of expressing
frustration and political demands are usually unavailable. Moller (1968) points out that the
youth population played an important role during the French Revolution and the rise of Nazism
in Germany in the 1930s (cited in Urdal 2004).

14

The brain’s prefrontal lobe, which is deemed to play an important role in preventing inappropriate behavior, does
not reach full development until the age of 20 (Fuller 2003).
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Youth bulges create instability in a society especially when social infrastructure is weak
and demands of these youth are not met. Fuller (2003) argues that young people will be more
prone to radical ideologies if they feel desperate and see few opportunities in the future (Fuller
2003). Some evidence shows that rising youth population increases support for Islamist
movements (Moghadam 2009; Urdal 2004). For example, violent Islamist movements such as
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria and Gamaa Islamiyya in Egypt rely on young,
uneducated, urban poor people (Dalacoura 2011). Indeed, youth population has played a
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Arguably, the large number of
unemployed youth in Arab nations, frustrated under repressive, autocratic, and corrupt regimes,
drove the Arab Spring (Mohammed 2011). For these young people who have a low socioeconomic status, participation in violent organizations becomes a tool for power and prestige,
mitigates feeling of insecurity and helplessness and offers a sense of identity (Dalacoura 2011;
Fuller 2003).
The Middle Eastern region, which is analyzed in this chapter, has the highest proportion
of youth population in the world: the average percentage of youth population−those under age of
thirty− is around sixty percent compared to only thirty percent in North America (Hoffman and
Jamal 2012). In addition to having a higher proportion of youth population, the unemployment
rate is also highest in the Middle East. According to a report by the International Finance
Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, the average youth (ages 15-24) unemployment rate
in the Middle East is twenty five percent compared to twelve percent in the world as of 2010.15
In sum, even though youth bulges is a theoretically significant concept, which has the
potential to increase political violence, none of the existing studies quantitatively tested the
15

http://www.e4earabyouth.com/downloads/IFCBook_A4_Online_Complete.pdf
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impact of youth bulges in fostering violence at the group-level. This chapter fills this gap in the
literature by examining the role of youth bulges in motivating the adoption of violent strategies
by ethno-political organizations. I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis: Ethno-political organizations that are active in countries in which there are
large youth cohorts will be more likely to resort to violence.
D. Data, Methods, and Research Design
I examine the causal factors that increase ethno-political organizations’ probability of use of
violence. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all active ethno-political
organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, is used to empirically test the hypothesis. The
Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project is a subsidiary of the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) project. The dataset includes 118 organizations representing the interests of all 22
ethno-political groups in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between
1980 and 2004. The data are unbalanced panel data in an organization year format with 1,789
observations. The MAROB data provides information about ideology, motivations, and
strategies (both violent and non-violent) of organizations as well as the state behavior (repressive
or tolerant towards the organization). In order to be included in the dataset, an organization
should meet the following criteria:
1. The organization makes explicit claims to represent the interests of one or more
ethnic groups and/or the organization’s members are primarily members of a specific
ethnic minority.
2. The organization is political in its goals and activities.
3. The organization is active at a regional and/or national level.
4. The organization was not created by a government.
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5. The organization is active for at least three consecutive years between 1980 and
2006.
6. Umbrella organizations (coalitions/alliances) are NOT coded. Instead, member
organizations are coded (MAROB codebook 2008).
The dependent variable is dichotomous; coded as 1 for the years during which the
organization used violence as a strategy and coded as 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable, so I use a logistic regression statistical estimator to test my hypothesis, with
robust standard errors clustered by country and organization. I use two ordinal variables from
MAROB data to create the dependent variable.16 These variables code the frequency of use of
violence by organizations as a strategy. Since I am interested in whether the organization adopts
a violent strategy or not rather than frequency of use of violence, I recoded these variables. Thus,
organizations that use violence either to target domestic or transnational entities are coded as 1.
In total, organizations used violence in 30.3 % of all organization years. I also include the
correlation matrices in Table 3.1 to document multicollinearity; there is no multicollinearity
problem.
Table 3.1 about here
Independent Variable and Control Variables
My primary independent variable is the existence of youth bulges in a society. The data on the
proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult male population (15+)
come from the United Nations World Population Prospects data. I also control for the following
variables in the empirical analysis since the review of the literature suggest that these variables
16

These variables are called “domorgviolence” and “transvioltarg” in the MAROB data, the description of variables
are in the Appendix 1.
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have the potential to affect the likelihood of resorting to violence by organizations: democracy,
state repression, political, economic, and cultural grievances, external support for organization,
organizational popularity, organizational split, leadership type, religious/Islamist ideology, a
dichotomous variable for organizations that operate in Israel, and GDP growth rate.
Regime type and state repression intend to test the impact of political opportunity
structure on the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Ethno-political
organizations that are active in democratic countries are expected to be less violence-prone since
other nonviolent strategies available could be less risky, less costly and hence more attractive. I
use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for regime type. I create a
dichotomous variable for democracies by coding countries with Polity scores greater than five as
one. Repression is like a double-edged sword; it can either deter or foster rebellion. Some
scholars suggest that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and dissidents’
probability of use of violence. While lower levels of repression may foster violence by
increasing grievances, extreme repression can deter insurgency since collective action becomes
very costly (Muller 1985). Unfortunately, it is not possible to test the curvilinear relationship
between state repression and use of violence with MAROB data since the variable that measures
state repression is an ordinal variable with only three categories. Therefore, I simply expect to
find a positive correlation between state repression and political violence. The state violence
measures whether the state uses lethal violence against the organization and ranges from 1 (no
repression) to 3 (high repression). I create a dummy variable by combining the second (periodic
lethal violence against the organization) and third (consistently high lethal repression of the
organization) categories. The repression is lagged one year to avoid problems in inferring causal
direction.
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Even though the empirical evidence is mixed, grievances have the potential to motivate
violence. Therefore, I control for grievances in the empirical analysis. Economic grievance,
cultural grievance, and political grievance data are taken from the MAROB data. Economic
grievance is an ordinal measure for the dominant economic grievance; zero denotes that there is
no expressed economic grievance; one means that eliminating economic discrimination is a
major goal, and two means that the organization focuses on creating or strengthening remedial
policies. Cultural grievances are also measured by an ordinal variable with three categories. All
of the ethno-political organizations included in the MAROB dataset have some sort of political
grievances, which make it hard to test the impact of political grievances. The dominant political
grievance of the organization in the original MAROB data is coded as the following:
1. Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination
2. Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies
3. Major organizational goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for
group
4. Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or
revanchist change in border of state
5. -88 Other
There are 703 (out of 1775) observations in the other category with text description of
these grievances such as “Palestinian independence”, “Establishing an Islamist state”, “regime
change” etc. To avoid dropping 703 observations in the other category, a close reading of each
case description was done by the author and each of the independence movements was coded as
a four. In other words, a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one for independence or
separationist movements, called “high political grievance” is created. Organizations that focus on
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gaining independence and/or establishing a separate state are expected to be more violenceprone. Alternatively, I create another dummy for only separationist organizations by coding
category number four above as one (it is called autonomy in the regressions below).
The variables that measure external support for organization and organizational
popularity are included to test the resource mobilization theory. An organization’s ability to
mobilize people and engage in collective action depends on existence of external and internal
support for the organization. To measure external support for the organization, four dummy
variables from the MAROB data are used. The organizations that received support (financial
support, human support, or political support) from diasporas, from foreign states, from
international governmental organizations, from international non-governmental organizations, or
from other non-state actors are coded as one. There is an ordinal variable (ranges from 1 to 3)
that measures organizational popularity among the group that the organization represents. I
create a dichotomous variable for highly popular, dominant organizations17 to test the impact of
domestic support.
I use two dichotomous variables from MAROB data, which measure intra-group
competition, in order to test the impact of organizational structure (the theory of out-bidding).
There is a dichotomous variable coded as one if there is an organizational split during the year of
observation. I also create a dummy for organizations with factionalized/competing leaders by
using the leadership type variable in MAROB data. Ethno-political organizations that are
fractionalized and/or have a weak/competing leadership are expected to be more violence-prone.
I use two variables to control for religion. There is a dichotomous variable which is coded as one
for organizations that have a religious ideology. For robustness, and to test the impact of
17

A dummy variable is preferred since the use of an ordinal variable leads to multicollinearity problem. Also, 87.9%
of all observations are in the middle category (number 2) which suggests that most of the organizations have some
sort of popularity. Therefore, controlling for dominant organizations is empirically more valid.
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Islamist ideology specifically, I create a dummy variable for organizations that focus on
establishing an Islamist state by using the text description found in the other political grievances
category.
Finally, I control for economic development and organizations that are active in Israel.
Israel is an outlier in the Middle East; it is a democratic, wealthy country with a long history of
conflict with the Palestinians. I use annual GDP per capita growth rate to control for economic
development. Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita (constant in 2005 international
dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables. Table 3.2 summarizes the list of variables used
in the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized whereas Table 3.3
summarizes descriptive statistics of variables.
Table 3.2 and 3.3 about here
E. Findings
In Model 1, I include annual GDP per capita growth rate, a dummy for democracy, youth bulges,
state repression, organizational popularity, external support, high political grievances, economic
grievances, cultural grievances, a dummy for organizations that have a religious ideology, and a
dummy for organizations located in Israel. Youth bulge is positive and significant, which
supports my hypothesis. State repression positively affects the likelihood of adopting violent
strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas democracy is insignificant; these findings
indicate that there is partial support for political opportunity structure argument. However,
caution is warranted in interpreting the insignificance of regime type; the analysis is limited to
the Middle East, which is predominantly non-democratic. There is not enough variation in this
explanatory variable, which may be the reason for the insignificant results.
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Economic grievances increase the probability of use of violent strategies. Interestingly,
the high political grievance dummy is insignificant; organizations that focus on gaining
independence or establishing a separate state are no more violence-prone than others. Therefore,
the relative deprivation argument is partially supported. Likewise, there is partial support for the
resource mobilization argument; external support is positive and significant but organizational
popularity−which intends to proxy domestic support for organization−is insignificant. The Israeli
dummy is positive and significant; ethno-political organizations that are active in Israel are
indeed more violence-prone. Religious ideology is not statistically significant whereas increasing
GDP growth rate has a pacifying effect.
In model 2, I drop the high political grievance dummy and replace it with an autonomy
dummy which is coded as one for separationist organizations (4th category of the dominant
political grievance variable in the original data). While autonomy is insignificant, like high
political grievance, impact of all other variables is similar to the previous model. In Model 3, I
drop the religious ideology dummy and replace it with a dummy for organizations that focus on
creating an Islamist state as a robustness check. Like religious ideology, an Islamist state dummy
is insignificant; there is no support for the argument that religious or Islamist organizations are
more violence-prone than non-religious ones.
I add organizational split and weak leadership dummies in Models 4 and 5 respectively18
to examine the impact of organizational structure. According to the theory of out-bidding, both
inter-group and intra-group competition cause more radicalization, thus increase the probability
of violent strategies. I can only examine the impact of intra-group competition since there is no

18

I added these two variables separately since they intend to measure the same concepts: intra-group competition
and organizational coherence.
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variable that measures inter-group competition in the MAROB dataset. 19 I use organizational
split and leadership type (weak/competing leaders indicate existence of intra-group competition)
to proxy intra-group competition. The findings indicate that fractionalized organizations and
organizations with competing/weak leadership are indeed more violence-prone than other ethnopolitical organizations. Youth bulge is positive and significant in Model 4 and Model 5, like in
previous models; one can conclude that the significance of youth bulge is robust to alternative
model specifications.
While the empirical analysis above confirms that youth bulges foster violence, exploring
the underlying causal mechanisms of youth-violence relationship and mediating variables is
another interesting research question. Those scholars who argue that youth bulges are more
prone to violence generally argue that such violence-proneness is conditional on other socioeconomic and political factors. High unemployment rate, state repression and autocracy are
among the commonly cited factors that act like a catalyst between violence and youth bulges. I
interact autocracy and youth bulges and democracy and youth bulges in Model 6 and Model 7,
respectively to see if the existence of youth bulges creates more problems in autocracies. The
interaction of youth bulge and autocracy is positive and significant, whereas the youthdemocracy interaction is insignificant. This finding suggests that youth bulges in autocratic
regimes tend to be more violence-prone than youth bulges in democratic regimes. Young people
in democracies can express their frustration/dissatisfaction through nonviolent means, whereas
such conventional strategies usually do not exist in autocracies, which makes resorting to
violence the only viable option. The graph in Figure 3.1 show the predicted probability of
violence for changing values of youth bulges in autocratic and other (non-autocratic) countries.
19

The dataset includes a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if there is an inter-organizational conflict. I did not
use this variable since it measures conflict rather than competition. Inter-organizational conflict is correlated with
the dependent variable (0.56); it may be tautological to use this variable as an explanatory factor.
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While the predicted probability of violence is higher in non-autocratic countries for low values of
youth bulges, autocratic countries face a greater risk of violence when the proportion of young
males exceeds about 38%. The higher risk of violence in non-autocratic countries may be
because of inclusion of both democracies and anocracies in this category. As visually seen in the
graph, the substantive impact of youth bulges in increasing risk of violence is higher in autocratic
countries compared to other countries.
Figure 3.1 about here
I also interact youth bulges with state repression, negative GDP growth rate,20 economic
grievances, and Islamist ideology in order to find out whether youth bulges foster violence when
coupled with any of these factors. I add these interacted variables one at a time to the model.
None of the interactions was significant. 21 I suspect that the insignificance of the interaction
terms might be due to the use of crude proxies to measure the theoretically relevant concepts or
alternatively limitations in the structure of the data. For example, economic grievance is an
ordinal variable with only three categories whereas repression is a dichotomous variable.
Overall, while the empirical analysis above suggests that the existence of youth bulges in general
increases likelihood of political violence at group-level, the insignificance of most of the
interaction terms is a theoretical puzzle that requires further research. Table 3.4 summarizes the
regression analysis.
Table 3.4 about here
Finally, I calculate the predicted probabilities to show the substantive importance of the
explanatory variables by using Models 4, 5, and 6. The predicted probability of an organizations’
use of violence is 5.7% when all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy
20

I do not have the unemployment data. Therefore, negative GDP growth rate is used to test whether impact of
youth bulges is conditional on economic development.
21
These alternative model specifications are reported in table 3.5, in Appendix. .
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variables are set to 0. The graph in Figure 3.2 shows the changes in predicted probability of use
of violence by ethno-political organizations as the proportion of youth bulges shifts from its
minimum value to maximum value. The probability of use of violence increases from 2% to 10%
as the proportion of young males shifts from 21% to about 40%. In other words, the probability
of use of violence by ethno-political organizations increases by 400%.
Figure 3.2 about here
The probability of use of violence increases from 5.7% to 13% when repression shifts
from 0 to 1 while all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are
set to 0. In other words, the predicted probability of use of violence increases by 131%.
Similarly, the probability of violence increases 100% when the weak leadership dummy shifts
from 0 to 1. Shifting external support from 0 to 1 also leads to a 115% increase in the probability
of violence. A shift in economic grievance from the lowest to highest value (0 to 2) leads to a
191% increase in the probability of violence. The impact of GDP growth rate is relatively small;
shifting GDP growth rate from 10th to 90th percentile leads to only a 20% decline in the
probability of violence. Shifting organizational split dummy from 0 to 1 leads to 188% increase
in the dependent variable. Lastly, a shift in youth*autocracy interaction from 0 to 0.39 (90th
percentile of youth bulge) leads to a 78% increase in the probability of violence.
All in all, these findings indicate that youth bulges, economic grievances, external
support for organization, state repression, organizational split, and fractionalized leadership all
increase probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations whereas
increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. Youth bulges especially foster violence in
autocratic regimes.
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F. Conclusion
In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death after his cart is
confiscated by a policewoman. This incident created a spillover effect of protests in many
Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring. 22 Some scholars describe the recent
uprisings in the Middle East as youth revolutions; those young people, dissatisfied with their
oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments
(Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter supports the
argument that existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increase the risk of resorting to
violence by ethno-political organizations.
In addition to youth bulges, other internal and external factors also influence decision to
resort to violence by organizations. Economic grievances and state repression foster violence
whereas increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. While political grievances are found
to be insignificant; one needs to be cautious while interpreting this finding. All of the
organizations included in the MAROB dataset have political grievances, which makes it hard to
explore role of political grievances. Organizational factors such as fractionalization and
competing leadership increase likelihood of resorting to violence, which confirms the theory of
outbidding. External support for the organization has a positive impact, whereas domestic
support (measured by organizational popularity) is insignificant; there is partial support for
resource mobilization theory. Religious/Islamist ideology is insignificant in all of the models;
there is no support for the argument that religious organizations are more violence-prone than
others.

22

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839143/Arab-Spring-timeline-of-theAfrican-and-Middle-East-rebellions.html
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In conclusion, two observations stand out. First, socio-economic and political factors
such as youth bulge, economic development, and state repression, as well as internal factors such
as organizational structure are crucial in the decision to resort to violence whereas religious
ideology does not seem to be a driving force. Second, these findings are consistent with the
findings of the previous chapter; religious ideology does not seem to make countries more or less
conflict prone once we control for socio-economic and political conditions that increase risk of
domestic armed conflict. Among all of the variables tested in this chapter and in the previous
chapter, state repression and economic grievances are significant in most of the regressions,
which suggests that violence is largely driven by socio-economic and political conditions.
Finally, it is important to note some of the limitations of this research. The analysis is
limited to only sixteen countries that are located in MENA region, which introduces a selection
bias problem and prevents making broader generalizations. The analysis is limited to MENA due
to limitations in data availability. Future research may test the generalizability of these findings
if cross-national data become available.
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Appendix 1: List of Tables
Table 3.1: Correlation of Variables

organizational split
economic grievance
cultural grievance
religious ideology
youth bulge
external support
Islamist ideology
repression
Israel

organizational economic cultural religious youth external Islamist repression Israel
split
grievance grievance ideology bulge support ideology
1
0.0192
1
0.0383 0.3631
1
0.0283 -0.0792
0.418
1
0.0542 0.0779
0.313 0.0322
1
0.0012 0.0514 -0.002 0.068 -0.081
1
0.0244 -0.0527 0.4417 0.4848 0.1183 -0.0843
1
0.0187 0.3888 0.2748 0.032 0.145 0.201 0.0486
1

democracy GDP
growth

democracy
GDP growth

-0.0027 -0.0357
-0.0339 -0.1182
0.0338 -0.0056

-0.228 -0.0179 -0.4689 -0.0975 -0.1131
-0.3391 -0.1216 -0.6788 0.0485 -0.0137
-0.0109 -0.0147 0.0008 0.0241 -0.0118

0.053
1
-0.0687 0.4375
0.0487 0.0055

1
0.0055

weaklead

0.4696 -0.0126

0.0443 0.0929 0.0435 0.0678 0.0036

0.0179 0.0053

0.0238 0.0335
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Table 3.2: Summary of Variables
Variable Name
Youth bulge
Annual GDP per capita growth rate (%)
Repression
Organizational popularity
External support
Religious ideology
Islamist ideology
High political grievance
Economic grievances
Cultural grievances
Democracy
Organizational split
Weak leadership
Israel

Concept
Demographic character
Economic development
Political Opportunity Structure
Domestic support (resource mobilization)
External support (resource mobilization)
Religion
Organizations that aim to create an Islamist state
Organizations that focus on creating a separate state/ gaining
independence
Economic grievances
Cultural grievances
Political Opportunity Structure
Organizational structure (resource mobilization)
Organizational structure (resource mobilization)
Dummy for organizations that operate in Israel
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Annual GDP growth rate (%)
Youth bulges
Repression
Polity 2
Prop. of young males
Organizational popularity
External support
Leadership Type
Religious ideology
Islamist ideology
High Political Grievance
Economic Grievance
Cultural Grievance
Autonomy
Autocracy
Democracy
Organizational split
Israel

Mean

Standard
deviation

Min

Max

0.012
. 31
0.131
−0.49
0.31
2.02
0.411
3.1
0.233
.072
0.386
0.258
0.562
0.186
0.325
0.485
0.029
0.163

0.181
0.057
0.337
7.91
0.057
0.461
0.492
0.754
0.423
0.259
0.487
0.617
0.857
0.389
0.468
0.499
0.168
0.37

-0.648
0.20
0
-10
0.206
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.605
0.41
881
10
0.411
3
1
4
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

91

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression on Use of Violence by Ethno-political Organizations (1980-2004)
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Repression

.886***
(.268)
7.474***
(2.461)
-.980***
(.378)
.324
(.334)

.885***
(.267)
7.497***
(2.466)
-.967**
(.379)
.335
(.341)

.865***
(.269)
7.554***
(2.465)
-.973**
(.382)

.903***
(.262)
7.126***
(2.549)
-.991***
(.382)
.328
(.343)

.897***
(.262)
7.306***
(2.5)
-1.026***
(.385)
.335
(.340)

.934***
(.27)
3.46
(3.17)
-1.059***
(.385)
.349
(.358)

.897***
(.262)
7.628***
(2.75)
-1.028***
(.384)
.334
(.34)

.585***
(.209)
-.117
(.163)

.175
(.456)
.518**
(.209)
-.03
(.15)

.591***
(.208)
-.03
(.164)

.579***
(.21)
-.119
(.161)

.609***
(.214)
-.095
(.163)

.579***
(.21)
-.118
(.161)

-.053
(.280)
.877***
(.207)
.359
(.291)
.194
(.259)

-.083
(.281)
.936***
(.216)
.335
(.282)
.198
(.262)

-.082
(.292)
.854***
(.208)
.369
(.282)
.155
(.26)

-.069
(.278)
.883***
(.204)
.375
(.283)
.186
(.259)

-.033
(.269)
.854***
(.2)
.41
(.272)

-.072
(.28)
.882***
(.204)
.38
(.283)
.474
(1.486)

Youth bulge
GDP growth
Religious ideology
Islamist ideology
Economic grievance
Cultural grievance
High political grievance

.570***
(.208)
-.137
(.163)
-.146
(.271)

Autonomy
External support
Organizational popularity
Democracy

.906***
(.233)
.360
(.289)
.207
(.256)

Autocracy
Organizational split

1.171***
(.37)

Weak leadership

-4.413**
(1.72)
1.217***
(.371)

.722*
(.369)

Youth*autocracy

11.584**
(4.6)

Youth*democracy
Israel
Peace years
Peace years

2

Peace years

3

N

1.173***
(.371)

.670**
(.331)
-1.560***
(.182)
.199***
(.045)
-.007***
(.003)
1649

.685*
(.358)
-1.560***
(.183)
.199***
(.045)
-.007***
(.002)
1649

.772**
(.349)
-1.573***
(.186)
.201***
(.046)
-.007***
(.002)
1649

.704**
(.361)
-1.557***
(.185)
.2***
(.046)
-.007***
(.003)
1649

.721**
(.359)
-1.558***
(.183)
.199***
(.045)
-.007***
(.003)
1644

.461
(.381)
-1.546***
(.183)
.197***
(.045)
-.007***
(.003)
1644

-.891
(4.679)
.696*
(.379)
-1.558***
(.183)
.197***
(.045)
-.007***
(.003)
1644

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).
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Table 3.5: Alternative Model Specifications
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Repression

3.587**
(1.814)
8.092***
(2.447)
-.995***
(.374)

.854***
(.272)
6.514**
(2.55)
-1.032***
(.388)

.895***
(.261)
7.4***
(2.5)

.876***
(.262)
7.521***
(2.6)
-1.032***
(.389)

Youth bulge
GDP growth

-2.362
(4.23)
.332
(.34)

Negative GDP growth
Religious ideology

.318
(.346)

.440
(.346)

Islamist ideology
Economic grievance
Cultural grievance
Autonomy
External support
Organizational popularity
Democracy
Organizational split
Youth*Repression

.606***
(.215)
-.109
(.161)
-.089
(.271)
.892***
(.207)
.360
(.287)
.178
(.258)
1.173***
(.367)
-8.034
(5.33)

-1.31
(1.589)
-.165
(.171)
-.159
(.275)
.886***
(.206)
.359
(.285)
.207
(.259)
1.228***
(.372)

.579***
(.209)
-.118
(.161)
-.076
(.279)
.883***
(.205)
.371
(.282)
.184
(.258)

9.244
(11.66)

Youth* Negative GDP growth
5.8
(4.663)

Youth* Economic grievance
Youth*Islamist ideology
Israel
Peace years
Peace years2
Peace years3
N

.741
(3.292)
.507**
(.209)
-.031
(.152)
-.101
(.28)
.943***
(.215)
.349
(.274)
.183
(.261)
1.168***
(.371)

.677*
(.361)
-1.565***
(.184)
.198***
(.045)
-.007***
(.003)
1644

.758**
(.346)
-1.543***
(.182)
.196***
(.045)
-.008***
(.003)
1644
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.722**
(.359)
-1.559***
(.186)
.198***
(.045)
-.007***
(.002)
1644

-1.668
(8.751)
.826**
(.353)
-1.571***
(.186)
.2***
(.046)
-.007***
(.002)
1644
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Appendix 3: Description of Variables (From MAROB codebook)
Dependent Variable:
DOMORGVIOLENCE: To what degree is the organization using violence domestically as a
strategy?
0 Organization is not using violence as a strategy
1 Organization is using violence as occasional strategy but is not specifically targeting persons.
2 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel
(including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and not government nonsecurity
personnel or civilians
3 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel
(including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and/or government nonsecurity
personnel, but not civilians
4 Organization is occasionally targeting civilians but most of its violent acts target security
5 Organization is targeting civilians regularly
TRANSVIOLTARG: To what degree is the organization using violence to target transnational
entities as a strategy? (The classification is the same as domorgviolence, ranges from 0 to 5)
Independent Variables:
ORGPOLGR Dominant political grievance of the organization
Value Label
1 Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination
2 Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies
3 Major organizational goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for group
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4 Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or revanchist
change in border of state
-88 Other: goal described in ORGPOLGRDES
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
ORGECGR Dominant economic grievance of the organization
Value Label
0 No expressed economic grievances
1 Economic grievances focused on elimination of discrimination
2 Economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
ORGCULTGR Code the dominant cultural grievance of the organization
Value Label
0 No expressed cultural grievances
1 Cultural grievances focused on elimination of discrimination
2 Cultural grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies (i.e.,
establishing or increasing state funding for cultural protection and/or promotion)
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
ORGSPLIT Did the organization split this year?
Value Label
0 No split
1 Split
-99 Unclear
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LEAD Type of leadership for organization
Value Label
1 Factionalized/competing leaders
2 Weak or decentralized leadership
3 Strong ruling council
4 Strong single leader
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
ORGPOP Popularity of organization
Value Label
1 Fringe- no evidence of support from group
2 One of several organizations with support from group
3 Dominant organization
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
RELORG Does the organization advocate policies that incorporate religion into
public life?
Value Label
0 No (non-religious)
1 Yes
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
DIASUP Has org. received support from diaspora in year being coded?
Value Label
0 No
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1 Yes
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
FORSTSUP Has org. received support from foreign state in year being coded?
Value Label
0 No
1 Yes
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
IGOSUP Has org. received support from international governmental organization in year being
coded?
Value Label
0 No
1 Yes
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
INGOSUP Has org. received support from international non-governmental organization or other
non-state actor?
Value Label
0 No
1 Yes
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment
STATEVIOLENCE
Does the state use violence against the organization?
Value Label
99

1- State is not using lethal violence against the organization
2- State is using periodic lethal violence against the organization
3- State is using consistent lethal violence against the organization
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CHAPTER 4

De-Radicalization and Moderation of Islamist Parties23

23

Some portions of this article have previously been published in July 2012 issue of Democratization with my coauthor A. Kadir Yildirim.
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A. Abstract
While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist
parties is also equally important which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the
evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better
understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the
wake of the “Arab Spring.” What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie
each form of moderation? By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, this
chapter introduces a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over
time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind
of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy
(rather than violent strategies) as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising
their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state
repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in a
platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic
liberalization, economic growth, generational changes, electoral loss and changing voter
preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, I analyze the Italian Communist Party,
the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, the Welfare Party, The Justice and
Development Party, the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat Party in
Egypt, the Hamas in Gaza strip, and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan. In providing evidence
through structured comparisons and field interviews, this chapter develops a generalizable theory
of radical party moderation.
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B. Introduction
While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist
parties is also equally important, which remains underexplored. The militant Islamist groups
receive disproportional media coverage, whereas the voices of those nonviolent or mainstream
organizations such as moderate political parties are hardly heard. When Islamist parties issue
statements, which emphasize commitment to democracy or respect for rule of law, their ‘true’
intentions are usually questioned. More specifically, there are theoretical debates about whether
Islam and democracy can coexist or not, and whether political parties with an Islamist ideology
can contribute to democratization or not, which is somehow similar to the debates about whether
Islam promotes violence or not. I explored driving forces of violence and radicalism in the
previous chapters. This chapter builds on the previous chapters by examining a reverse trend: deradicalization and the moderation of Islamist parties.
While the debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not continue,
support for Islamic-oriented political parties has increased considerably since the 1980s.
Attempts by Islamic parties to participate in political systems in semi-democratic Muslim
societies are crucial in understanding the democratic consolidation of these countries. On the one
hand, some scholars and policy makers contend that Islamist parties’ participation should be
viewed with caution since they might have the hidden agenda of changing the regime and
establishing an Islamic state once they come to power. Schwedler (1998) calls this possibility
‘the paradox of democracy’; the idea that democratic processes might empower nondemocratic
actors. Yet, there is no historical case supporting a hidden agenda argument. On the other hand,
others contend that the inclusion of these Islamic parties leads to moderation and hence helps
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democratic consolidation (Nasr 2005; Schwedler, 2006; Wickham 2004). Indeed, there is a
growing trend of shifting from ideology-oriented policies to moderate pragmatic policies among
Islamic oriented parties and growing support for these moderate Islamic parties (Nasr, 2005).
Moderation appears to have emerged as a key term in discussions about Islamists and
Islamist political participation in the Muslim world, as Schwedler (2007) duly notes. That
violence, radicalism, and opposition to democracy are increasingly viewed as illegitimate means
for political participation led many Islamists to reframe their political discourse accordingly.
This trend has been most visible within the context of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.
However, there exists great variation—both among Islamists and others—as to what the notion
of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catch-all term.
In popular discourse, virtually every Islamist group either has a claim on moderation, or
is being cast as an example of moderation. Examples include the Party for Justice and
Development in Morocco (PJD), 24 the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, 25 the Yemeni Islah
Party, 26 the Algerian Islah Party, 27 the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), 28 the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,29 Al-Nahda in Tunisia,30 the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,31 and
24

“Don't Hang the Barber,” Economist, July 24, 2003; Khadija Finan, “Western Sahara Impasse,” Le Monde
Diplomatique, January 11, 2006; “Islamists Slip in Moroccan Elections,” Christian Science Monitor, September 10,
2007; “Morocco: Islamists Divided, Jihadists Contained, Monarchy Secure,” Stratfor Report, September 7, 2007.
25
“Jordan Questions Dozens Over Amman Bombings,” ABC News Online, November 12, 2005
(http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200511/s1505087.htm - accessed January 30, 2011); Clark 2006.
26
“Yemen Pursuing Terror Its Own Way; Tactics, Results Vary, But Target Is Al Qaeda,” The Washington Post,
October 17, 2002.
27
“Algerian Leader Eyes Poll Victory,” BBC, April 7, 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3607603.stm accessed January 30, 2011).
28
“Turkey: Post-Islamists in Power,” Le Monde Diplomatique, March 6, 2003.
29
Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata, “Hear out Muslim Brotherhood,” Boston Globe, March 25, 2007; “Egypt's
Banned Muslim Brotherhood Wins 29 More Seats in Runoff Polls,” USA Today, November 27, 2005; Matthew
Kaminski, “Among the Muslim Brothers: The Contradictory Faces of Political Islam in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” The
Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2011.
30
Mahan Abedin, “Islamist Leader Returns From Exile – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannoushi,” Le Monde
Diplomatique, 31 January 2011; Gearon, Eamonn, 2011. “The ‘Real Deal’ Revolutions.” Middle East 421: 18-21;
Olivier Roy, “The Tunisian Revolt: Where Have All the Islamists Gone?” Christian Science Monitor, January 21,
2011
31
“Syria Muslim Brotherhood Leader Urges West to Boycott Assad,” Lebanon Wire, March 18, 2006.
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Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.32 When groups as diverse as the Turkish AKP and Hamas
are branded as “moderate,” the term is likely to lose much of its distinctiveness. This apparent
lack of consensus on moderation is not limited to popular discourse. Scholarly literature also
shows great variance as to the meaning and causes of Islamist moderation. Such variation might
be a symptom of the different types of Islamist moderation. Hence, the question guiding this
research is as follows: What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each
form of moderation?
From a social science perspective, the inconsistent use of the term moderation amounts to
“conceptual stretching” implying that some attributes of the concept are eliminated in favor of
broader applicability, which ultimately decreases the usefulness of the concept (Sartori 1970;
Goertz 2006). This suggests a lack of progress toward a coherent and systematic approach to
explaining Islamist moderation. A more systematic approach is thus likely to contribute to a
better understanding of Islamist moderation in a cross-national perspective.
Another implication is that moderation can become an instrument in ideological
struggles; different factions may utilize the concept to gain legitimacy and sympathy from a
broader domestic and international audience. Where moderation and democracy have become the
currency of political discourse, it is crucial to understand what kind of moderation each party
claims and the conditions under which such moderation comes about. 33 Finally, a better
understanding of moderation is necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the
“Arab Awakening.” That Islamist parties are key political actors in the Middle East and whether

32

“Hamas Represents Islamic “Current of Moderation,” Al-Arabiya TV, September 9, 2007.
Moderation can also be a double-edged sword; hence, parties need to maintain a delicate balance between actual
moderation and retaining ideological purity of the party to prevent credibility problems and not to alienate core
supporters (D’Alimonte 1999; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004; Kitschelt 1994, as cited in Adams et al. 2006).

33
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Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of
transitions in the region.
In this chapter, I analyze Islamist moderation to identify the different forms it takes and
to explain how each kind of moderation comes about. To this end, I present a preliminary
systematic framework, arguing that moderation of Islamist parties takes on two complementary
forms. The first form of moderation is marked by a change in strategy. Islamist parties choose to
participate in the formal political structure (rather than use of violent tactics) by renouncing their
original stance, i.e., that the formal political structure is irrelevant to their ultimate goal of an
Islamic state. All of this is done, however, without compromising their core ideology. Such
limited engagement implies that Islamists will work within the procedural rules of an electoral
game, yet the end-goal remains the same—replacement of the existing system with an Islamic
one. Hence, Islamist parties shift from use of violent strategies to nonviolent electoral
participation and have a strong conviction that they can attain the ultimate goal via popular
support, which leads the ideological platform to remain largely unchanged, and Islamist parties
to remain policy-seeking parties. I call this process tactical moderation.34
Some Islamist parties, however, go further and overhaul major elements of their ideology
in favor of more centrist positions. Specifically, these parties change their ideological positions
on democracy, the economic system, and the political role of Islam. This shift is a clear
indication that the party has moved toward becoming a vote-seeking party rather than a policyseeking one. I call this second kind of moderation ideological moderation. The causal factors
that motivate each type of moderation differ from each other. While the tactical moderation is
largely driven by structural factors (e.g., political liberalization, international factors, failure of
34

The term “tactical moderation” is previously used in different contexts such as Spanish Communist Party, PSOE,
(Share 1985) and the British Labor Party (Barker 1973). The use of the term for Islamist groups did not occur until
very recently (Matesan 2009).
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non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals and regime repression), societal factors, such
as socioeconomic changes, electoral participation, and intra-party dynamics, motivate ideological
moderation.
The theory developed in this chapter rests in part on the findings of the Communist
moderation literature, and more broadly on party moderation. The motivation for reliance on
Western Communist party moderation literature is twofold. Theoretically, the literature on
Communist moderation presents a coherent conceptual framework with which to analyze
Islamist moderation. Secondly, and more conceptually, a crossover from Communist moderation
to Islamist moderation points to a key categorical similarity between Communist and Islamist
parties. Both kinds of parties are anti-system parties; that is to say both, ideally, want to replace
the current political, economic and social system with one that is in line with their ideological
commitments.
Empirically, I analyze The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Moroccan Party for
Justice and Development (PJD) in a comparative perspective. I also examine several other cases
of moderation in the Middle East and I apply the theoretical framework developed in this chapter
to these cases. The PCI has been one of the most radical, yet simultaneously one of the most
influential and successful working-class parties in Western Europe in the 20th century. Hence the
PCI case offers insights into the moderation of Western Communist parties. For its part, the PCI
helps to substantiate the theoretical argument as I build on the Communist moderation literature
to analyze Islamist moderation. The analysis relies on secondary literature, and aims to offer a
comparative perspective on Islamist moderation. The analysis of the PJD relies on interviews
with party officials in Morocco, and primary sources, i.e., party publications. The PJD’s
selection offers a unique opportunity. The party is one of the few Islamic parties that has traveled
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the whole spectrum of moderation from extreme radicalism in the 1970s to a mainstream Muslim
democratic platform in the 21st century, and allows observing both kinds of moderation in a
single case.
This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islamist
moderation and identify distinct hypotheses of Islamist moderation. Then, I present a succinct
review of the Western Communist party moderation literature, and introduce the theoretical
framework for analyzing Islamist moderation based on this literature. In this, I utilize the
moderation of the Italian PCI to demonstrate the framework. In the third section I analyze the
Moroccan PJD. The fourth section briefly reviews various cases of Islamist moderation in
different countries and examines how well each case of moderation fits to the theory of Islamist
moderation developed in this chapter. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses
the implications of the analysis.
C. Islamist Moderation in the Literature
There exists a wide range of arguments on what constitutes Islamist moderation and the causal
factors leading to moderation. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis is one of the most important
arguments on Islamist moderation (Brooks 2002; Brumberg 2002; Willis 2004; Schwedler 2006,
2007 and 2011; Wickham 2004; Tezcur 2010), and on party moderation more broadly (Tilly
1978; Kitschelt 1986; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Tarrow 1994; Bermeo 1997). Islamist
parties’ inclusion in the formal political structure (such as elections) is highlighted as the leading
cause of moderation because it leads Islamist parties to recognize the constraints of a formal
system, and to moderate as a result. On the other hand, exclusive regimes lead to radicalization
and legitimate the use of violence, as discussed in previous chapters (Hafez 2003). In a recent
analysis, Schwedler (2011) offers the most critical review of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis
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to date. Schwedler, essentially, distinguishes three discrete arguments within the body of this
argument: ideological moderation of parties, of individuals, and behavioral moderation.
Others have suggested variants of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Wickham (2004)
uses a combination of inclusion-moderation and social learning hypotheses to explain the
emergence of the Wasat Party in Egypt, emphasizing middle generation Islamist leaders’
interactions with people from “other” convictions and ideologies as a key factor in their
moderation. Cavatorta (2006) and Yilmaz (2009) also emphasize social learning in other
contexts. In a similar way, electoral participation is viewed as a key cause of moderation and
democratization (El-Ghobashy 2005; McFaul and Wittes 2008; Hovdenak 2009).
Clark, however, challenges the inclusion-moderation hypothesis by arguing that any
meaningful cross-ideological cooperation—as an observable implication of moderation—
requires a “spirit” of compromise and an intra-organizational discussion of compromise (2006,
542). For Clark, inclusion/participation in a formal political structure of multiple ideological
stripes is not sufficient to bring about moderation; moderation on the part of the Islamist party
(IAF) must come first for cooperation and compromise to emerge. Yet, Robinson (1997) argues
that Jordanian IAF’s moderation—as evidenced by its support for the democratic opening in
Jordan in the late 1980s—emanated out of self-interest. For Robinson, IAF’s decision to support
political liberalization then was not because the group was made up of “Jeffersonian democrats”
but because the group had a genuine “organizational interest” in liberalization.
Underscoring institutional factors, Wegner and Pellicer (2009) argue that the nature of
the relationship between the Islamic party and the Islamic movement the party hails from is a key
dynamic of moderation. For moderation to emerge the Islamic party should be sufficiently
autonomous from the Islamic movement, according to Wegner and Pellicer. In the case of the
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PJD in Morocco, the party turned out to be more moderate because it set up its own mobilization
resources, and the party organization was institutionalized distinctly from the Islamic movement.
The strategic interaction hypothesis highlights Islamist parties’ interactions with secular
governments and military as a determinant of Islamist moderation. The credibility of signals sent
by the moderating party is deemed to be crucial in convincing the state and others that the party’s
moderation is not a “Trojan horse.” The costliness of the signal is a factor contributing to the
credibility of moderation (Kalyvas 2000). In a variant, state-military repression of Islamist
groups (such as deprivation of freedoms of assembly and religious practice, arbitrary detentions
and imprisonment) forces Islamists to moderate their ideological stance on various issues in
order to ensure survival (Mecham 2004; Ozbudun 2006; Somer 2007; Cizre ed. 2009). However,
repression also has the potential to foster radicalization and violence, as discussed in previous
chapters. Ashour (2009:139) points out that “repressive autocrats breed violent theocrats”. For
example, state repression has led to moderation of Islamist parties in Turkey whereas repression
led to radicalization of the Algerian FIS.
Finally, some scholars offered socioeconomic explanations for Islamist moderation.
Typically, the analogy is to Moore’s (1966) emphasis on the bourgeoisie’s role in bringing
democracy. The size of the middle class directly correlates with the moderation and democratic
disposition of the country in general (Demiralp 2009; Gulalp 2001; Gumuscu 2010; Langohr
2002; Lipset 1994; Nasr 2005 and 2009; Salame 1994; Yavuz 2009; Zakaria 2004). Some make
the link between a stronger middle class and Islamist moderation more explicit (Nasr 2005 and
2009), while others emphasize economic liberalization’s potential to create a business group with
“a stake in openness, in rules, and in stability” (Zakaria 2004, 16).
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Table 1 summarizes key arguments regarding Islamist moderation. Overall, the literature
on Islamist moderation is expansive, yet little agreement exists. Two interrelated problems stand
in the way of a generalizable theory of Islamist moderation: 1) how moderation is defined, and 2)
the large degree of variance of moderation across different studies. While one analysis considers
it sufficient for a party to participate in elections for moderation to occur (Robinson 1997),
another account might find it insufficient because the adoption of democratic ideals and
pluralism is deemed to be a more critical signal of moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005). Hence,
moderation takes on different meanings suggesting that there may be different kinds of
moderation. Second, the multitude of processes and competing explanations on moderation—i.e.,
inclusion, participation, organizational interest, party autonomy, social learning, socioeconomic
factors—imply that varying mechanisms of moderation exist. It may be the case that for one
particular kind of moderation to emerge (i.e., giving up violence) a particular set of factors
should exist (i.e., state repression, or political liberalization). In summary, there is no framework
that systematically connects various explanations of moderation. Although most explanations
deserve merit given the cases and their contexts, in the absence of a unified framework it is
virtually impossible to reach a theory of Islamist moderation.
D. Communist Moderation in the Literature
In what follows I review the Communist moderation literature, and more broadly the party
moderation literature, in order to provide a more systematic explanation to the question of
moderation. Unlike the literature on Islamist moderation, Communist moderation literature
presents a coherent conceptual framework by which one can analyze Islamist moderation. Both
Communist and Islamist parties are anti-system parties; they both want to replace the current
political, economic and social system with one that is in line with their ideological commitments.
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I argue that two distinct kinds of moderation exist in both Communist and Islamist party
moderation: tactical moderation and ideological moderation. They differ on both the extent of
moderation and its underlying causes.
I define tactical moderation as the kind of moderation where anti-system parties (i.e.,
Communist or Islamist) strategically decide to embrace electoral democracy to realize their
ideological goal of a different political, economic and social system while renouncing the use of
violence. Democracy thus carries an instrumental value. Such moderation arises in response to
changes in domestic institutional structure (i.e., political liberalization, economic crises), shifting
international influence, or the failure of non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals (Gray
1980; Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Share 1988; Waller & Fennema 1988; Ishiyama 1995;
Gunther et al. 2004). I call these structural factors. The primary motivation behind tactical
motivation is that by adapting to changing circumstances, anti-system parties are still convinced
that they can fulfill their ideological goals. Hence, notwithstanding the use of democratic means,
anti-system parties retain most of their ideology.
Ideological moderation, in contrast, is marked by a major transformation of the central
tenets of party ideology. For Communist parties, this translates into modified positions on
capitalism, western alliance, and pluralist democracy. For Islamist parties, it involves embracing
pluralist democracy, the free market, and Muslim values. Electoral dynamics underlie ideological
moderation. Because parties want to win a greater share of votes and be more responsive to the
electorate to prevent increasing marginalization, they moderate their ideologies. Societal factors
(i.e., intraparty dynamics, economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing
voter preferences) are deemed to play a key role in bringing about ideological moderation
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(Amyot 1981; Ishiyama 1995; Share 1988 and 1999; D’Alimonte 1999; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999;
Greene 2002; Berman 2008; Somer-Topcu 2009).35
Communist Moderation and the Italian Communist Party
Several mechanisms are offered in the scholarly literature to explain the moderation of Western
Communist parties. While some scholars focus on intra-party dynamics, others emphasize
electoral incentives and survival concerns. The ideological rigidity of the party (Cuenca-Sánchez
2004), power struggles between radicals and reformists within the party, leadership change
(Charlton 1979, Ishiyama 1995; Tucker 1967), the structure of political system (Berman 2008),
electoral system (Ishiyama 1995; Share 1999), economic growth or crises (Berman 2008;
Putnam 1978; Share 1988) and international factors, such as the decline of the Soviet influence
(Amyot 1981; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999), are among the commonly cited causes of post-communist
moderation.
Tucker (1967) argues that a radical movement that survives for a long time without the
opportunity to implement its objectives undergoes a deradicalization process in which initial
deradicalization creates pressure for further deradicalization. Tucker points out four
manifestations of the deradicalization of Marxist movements: 1) change in patterns of action, 2)
change in strategy and tactics, 3) intra-party conflict between reformists and radicals, and 4)
ideological deradicalization. While Tucker’s first two manifestations of deradicalization pertain
to what I call tactical moderation, the latter two are examples of ideological moderation.
Charlton (1979) analyzes the deradicalization of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the 1970s
based on Tucker’s framework and argues that changes in the domestic and international
35

On ideological moderation, the literature suggests additional explanations. The most prominent among such
explanations is Downs’ (1957) median voter theorem, arguing that once parties start playing the electoral game, they
are forced to appeal to the plurality of voters, which in turn leads to broad, centrist platforms. Challenging a crucial
assumption in the median voter theorem, others argued that ideological change in political parties reflects shifts in
voter preferences (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Adams et al. 2006).
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environments played an important role in the PCF’s changes in action-pattern, strategy and
tactics. This early phase of deradicalization is cited as a major causal factor for ideological
deradicalization; the tension between ideology and practice eventually leads to modification of
the ideology.
According to Cuenca-Sánchez (2004), ideological rigidity, which is affected by
organizational reforms, generational renewal, and leadership, might prevent moderation even
though moderation might potentially lead to electoral gains. For example, the PSOE in Spain
decreased its vote share in 1979 and the general secretary suggested a renouncement of Marxism
in order to gain more votes. However, 61% of PSOE delegates rejected this offer claiming that
electoral benefits would not be worth the ideological sacrifice. Similarly, the British Labor Party
lost all national elections between 1979 and 1997 due to its radical position, yet refused to
moderate until the mid-1990s (Cuenca-Sánchez 2004).
The structure of the political system is another factor which affects the likelihood of
moderation. In weak democracies, in which governments fail to meet citizens’ demands and to
prevent the armed struggle of communists, communist political parties remain committed to
revolutionary tactics, whereas the existence of strong democracies and economic development
facilitates moderation (Berman 2008). Lastly, failure of non-democratic strategies to achieve
ideological goals in the past or in other parts of the world (Pasquino 1980), declining Soviet
influence (Amyot 1981), and economic growth (Putnam 1978) also contributed to the
moderation of communist parties.
Western Communist parties’ initial experience with moderation dates back to the 1930s
with the adoption of the Popular Front strategy. This two-stage strategy—as dictated by the
Comintern—envisioned first an anti-fascist coalition coming to power through democratic

114

means, also called “progressive democracy,” and then preparing the society for a socialist
revolution (Amyot 1981). The Popular Front was a new tactic rather than a fundamental
ideological change since Communist parties remained committed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology
and saw democracy as instrumental for their end-goal. The key change was giving up armed
struggle to achieve socialist revolution; hence it conforms to tactical moderation.
Togliatti, PCI’s Secretary General between 1926 and 1964, promoted the Italian version
of the Popular Front strategy, via italiana al socialismo (Amyot 1981, 41). Togliatti’s gradualist
approach to acquiring state power emphasized a parliamentary road to socialism rather than
revolution. He eliminated the militant image of the PCI, dismissed the idea of non-collaboration
with non-leftist groups, and tried to legitimize the PCI as a national party prioritizing Italian
national interests (Gray 1980; Samuels 2003). Although Togliatti’s efforts constituted a key step
in moving the PCI away from radicalism and non-participation, the change ultimately remained
tactical. Togliatti tried to create a “partito nuovo, one open to Catholics and former fascists as
well as doctrinally orthodox” that did not compromise the party’s core ideology (Samuels 2003).
Although many refer to Togliatti’s pragmatic personality to explain PCI’s tactical moderation
(Amyot 1981; Gray 1980; Pasquino 1980; Samuels 2003), external factors explain the
transformation better. Togliatti viewed extreme leftism as risky since such experiences in the
1920s almost destroyed the Italian left (Gray 1980). Similarly, the defeat of Communist guerillas
in Greece (1944-1949) showed the failure of armed struggle in a world divided between two
ideological camps (Pasquino 1980). Hence, Samuels notes, Togliatti was convinced that “the
domestic and international balance of forces would not support a [communist] insurrection in
any event” (2003, 303). Stronger governments of the postwar period also reinforced this
perspective especially when contrasted with the interwar period which was plagued with weak
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governments unable to prevent armed struggle and ideas about a revolutionary path to
communism (Berman 2008).
Beginning with the 1960s, Eurocommunism increasingly gained traction among Western
Communist parties (Spieker 1980). It laid out the disassociation from the Soviet Union and a
break with Leninist ideology as cornerstones of a new era (Gentili and Panebianco 1980; Waller
and Fennema 1988). For some, Eurocommunism was a major sign of de-radicalization among
Western Communist parties (Amyot 1981; Devlin 1979). Yet, others challenged this view as a
vague concept, arguing that it was not clear whether Communist parties embraced democratic
principals, or viewed them as a means to achieve Marxist ideological goals (Sánchez-Cuenca
1999; Spieker 1980). Skepticism about Eurocommunism arose specifically because Communist
parties still viewed a dual role for themselves, a party of both “government” and “revolution.”
Eurocommunism’s emphasis on “organized mass movements” and their role as “the first step to
the hidden dictatorship of the Communist party” aggravated suspicions. Eurocommunist parties
also failed to guarantee certain basic civil rights such as freedom of organization and political
activity, and they were vague on property rights (Spieker 1980, 442-443). Hence,
Eurocommunism exemplified another case of tactical moderation.
As for the PCI, Eurocommunist ideals brought the party a step closer to ideological
moderation. With the 1964 Yalta Memorandum and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, the PCI slowly disassociated itself from the Soviet Union by emphasizing polycentrism
(multiple roads to socialism) (Pasquino 1980). Moreover, post-war economic growth led to
gradual changes in attitudes toward the European Economic Community (Gentili and Panebianco
1980). Yet, similar concerns about ideological conservatism and the limits of transformation
were leveled against the PCI. While party behavior in the parliament showed loyal opposition,
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messages and declarations of the PCI did not favor a democratic system (Pasquino 1980, 91).
The rank and file of the party, especially older members, remained committed to the
revolutionary ideology (Gray 1980). Also, the party did not stray too far from the Soviet Union
albeit with a “national emphasis” (Samuels 2003). Yet, communist parties’ moderation required
that they sever ties with the Soviet Union (Sánchez-Cuenca 1999, 21).
PCI’s Historic Compromise in the 1970s and the accompanying policy shifts are
examples of ideological moderation that transformed the party from a policy-seeking one to a
vote-seeking one. Changing socioeconomic conditions in the 1960s did not bode well for PCI in
terms of membership or party ideology. Italy experienced economic growth in the post-war
period, undermining PCI’s expectation for a capitalist crisis. PCI’s membership and organization
thus weakened in this period. By the late 1960s, the PCI lost one third of its entire membership
(Samuels 2003). International economic constraints and domestic constraints played a crucial
role in PCI’s dramatic shift on positions regarding a NATO alliance and the European
Community. Italy’s export-oriented postwar economic growth required integration with the
world economy as well, especially with Western Europe and North America. Public opinion also
favored European integration and good relations with the US. European integration was popular
even among the Communist electorate during late 1960s and early 1970s while Communist
leaders remained suspicious of it. These electoral incentives and PCI’s need for an alliance with
non-Communists put pressure on the PCI leadership to moderate positions on foreign policy
(Putnam 1978).
The most crucial step toward ideological moderation of the Italian Communist Party
came in 1972, largely as a result of deep socioeconomic transformation in Italian society. Enrico
Berlinguer, PCI’s leader at the time, proposed the Historic Compromise at the XIII Party

117

Congress. By accepting the proposal, the PCI decided to support governments led by Christian
Democrats (DC) in return for two tangible benefits: greater legitimacy and the introduction of
structural reforms that would include elements of socialism (D’Alimonte 1999; Gentili and
Panebianco 1980).36 Increasing numbers of middle class youth (1968-78), who joined the party
for positions rather than revolutionary commitment, were also influential in the historic
compromise (Amyot 1981). Between 1976 and 1979, the PCI supported DC-led governments
directly, or indirectly (through abstention in the Parliament). It also accepted NATO and
European integration, key issues that would facilitate collaboration with the DC (Samuels 2003).
Hence, key elements of the party’s communist ideology were relinquished, paving the way for
ideological moderation. As a testament to the party’s ideological moderation, between the early
1960s and the late 1970s, the PCI moved from the extreme left (-30) to center left (-7) in the leftright spectrum (Manifesto Project). In the same period, the PCI virtually eliminated its statist
discourse on the economy and instead expressed favorable views on capitalism.37 In the short
term, PCI’s ideological moderation led to an increase in popular support, confirming the idea that
societal changes and electoral concerns motivated PCI’s ideological moderation. The party
increased its vote share from 27% in the early 1970s to around 35% in the mid-1970s.
However, it is important to note that the PCI’s ideological moderation was still a work in
progress in the 1970s. For example, according to a majority of the rank and file of the party
members, the Historic Compromise was driven by tactical motives to eventually come to power
(Amyot 1981). The Historic Compromise also led to intraparty conflicts within the PCI; there
36

Another concern for the PCI was the possibility of a fascist union between the center and the right as exemplified
by the 1973 military coup in Chile where a left wing government that tried to rule out Christian Democrats was
crushed by the military (Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Sassoon 1981). By accepting capitalism and democracy, the
PCI would be able to avoid the worst outcome.
37
On market regulation, PCI moved from over 6 points to almost 0; on nationalization, the party moved from 3 to 0;
on planned economy, from 9 to 2. The points indicate the number of mentions in party programs; greater figures
imply more mentions and greater significance. The data are from the Manifesto Project Database.
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were different interpretations on the new policy. Even though Berlinguer argued that the
sacrifices were needed to introduce elements of socialism in Italy, some regarded it as “a policy
of subordination” (Sassoon 1981: 228-29). In a personal interview in 1977, Dr. Antonio Tato,
one of the closest figures to Berlinguer, stated that:
“Gramsci’s proletarian hegemony has not been abandoned by the PCI. The hegemony is
not the hegemony of a party but of a class. The Historic Compromise will provide the
transition period to the new hegemony, and the means by which the DC in particular
accepts the new force (proletarian class) politically as the dominant trend in Italy”
(Rusceo 1982: 114).
The rise of left wing terrorism and Red Brigades’ kidnapping of DC leader Moro eventually
led to the PCI’s withdrawal from the DC led government in 1979 (Sassoon 1981). The PCI
continued its moderation later throughout the 1980s making the policy of “democratic
alternative” a key element of its platform in the 1980s. Yet, the PCI continued to be criticized by
major portions of Italian society on various grounds, including a lack of internal democracy,
commitment to vestiges of Marxism-Leninism, and a relative lack of commitment to Italy’s
international alliances (Daniels 1987). As a result, the PCI was left politically isolated. While
some blamed the PCI’s Historic Compromise for its declining popularity, others referred to left
wing revolutionary terrorist episodes that were prevalent in the 1970s. Even though the PCI
condemned the terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of the terrorists made the party appear to belong in a
“Communist family” album (Weinberg 1995:49).
In a further move to carve a niche in the political landscape and move away from its
association with communism, the PCI adopted “new internationalism,” advocating a more
independent role for Western Europe between the superpowers, during the 17th party congress in
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1986. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was also condemned. The main motivational
factors in the evolution of the PCI’s international choices were to gain closer ties with other leftwing parties in Europe and to become an acceptable, legitimate partner in government (Daniels
1987). In 1988, Achille Occhetto, the young reformist leader of the PCI, proposed radical
changes for the party, called the new discourse. Occhetto focused on a new political agenda,
emphasizing the role of women in Italy, environmental problems, and an expansion of
democratic rights. Intra-party democracy was also strengthened, ending the idea of democratic
centralism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Occhetto pushed for further changes and proposed
to change the party’s name; a new party founded on the principles of democracy and human
liberation was needed since the old conflict between capitalism and socialism became obsolete
(Weinberg 1995). Finally in 1991, the PCI adopted a social democratic strategy and transformed
itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Sánchez-Cuenca claims that the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the elimination of the Soviet constraint enabled full moderation of the PCI:
“Moderation meant for the PCI ceasing to be communist; credibility was attained at the cost of
renouncing its very identity” (1999, p. 23).
In summary, PCI’s moderation was motivated by two sets of factors leading to two
different kinds of moderation. International factors and constraints convinced the PCI of the need
to relinquish the “militant liturgy” and adhere to procedural democracy in the 1940s. Such a
limited moderation (tactical moderation) did not necessitate ideological compromise, while
electoral democracy could be instrumentally valuable in reaching communism gradually instead
of revolution. The PCI’s ideological change (ideological moderation) came only after the 1960s.
The party renounced central tenets of its communist ideology, thereby enabling the PCI to
endorse pluralist democracy, capitalism, European integration and NATO. PCI’s tactical
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moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy
and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure
organizational survival. In contrast, it was largely societal changes in Italy that motivated PCI’s
ideological moderation and eventual transformation into the PDS; international factors such as
the fall of the Berlin Wall played a comparatively minor role in this process. In Table 2, I present
a summary of PCI’s moderation along with that of the Moroccan PJD, which is discussed next.
E. Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco
Like the Italian PCI, the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development’s (PJD) experience with
moderation also came in two distinct phases: tactical moderation between the 1980s and the
1990s, and ideological moderation after 2000. Both types of moderation are discussed below.
PJD’s origins lie in the Islamic Youth Association (Al-Shabiba), an Islamist organization
established in 1969, which was largely influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
prominent and highly controversial leader, Sayyid Qutb. During this period, the Islamic Youth
Association viewed use of violence to establish an Islamic state as a legitimate tool, while
participating in the political process was deemed to be against Islamic principles (Tlaidi
interview, 2009; Shahin 1997, 182). In 1970s, King Hassan II banned the organization and
persecuted many members within the group due to the Islamic Youth Association’s involvement
in violent activities (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 159).38
In 1981, a new organization called Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) was
established by the younger leaders of the group. The new group emerged with revisions in
organizational structure, ideology and practice. Unlike the Islamic Youth Association, Al-Jama’a
Al-Islamiyya rejected the revolutionary ideology of Qutb and decided to participate in the
38

Despite allegations, the group rejected any part in the violence (Burgat and Dowell 1997, 172). Even though the
group was formally outlawed in 1975, members continued its activities for years (Shahin 1997, 188).
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political system. The goal was to “push” the government to apply Islamic law gradually. Wegner
and Pellicer note that Al-Jama’a’s goals during this period conform to classical Islamist
discourse: “…To renew the understanding of religion, to advocate the implementation of sharia
law, to achieve a comprehensive cultural renaissance, to work on accomplishing the unity of
Muslims, to confront ideologies and ideas which they believed were subversive to Islam, and to
raise the educational and moral level of the Moroccan people” (2009, 160).
Al-Jama’a officially recognized “the political and religious legitimacy of the monarchic
regime” while many members of the group still regarded participation in politics as un-Islamic
(haram). The group published a report called “The Paper of Political Participation” to justify the
political participation (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 160). According to this report Al-Jama’a
decided to participate in politics to reach a wider audience, to break the “siege of secularists” and
to obtain parliamentary immunity to ensure the security of dawa (religious mission) activities
(Tlaidi interview, 2009). In 1992, Al-Jama’a changed its name to Harakat al-Islah wal-Tajdid
al-Maghribiyya (Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal) to reassert its commitment to
the rules of the political game in Morocco (Shahin 1997, 191). Thus far, the trajectory of the
Movement closely resembled that of the PCI. Initial extremism and rejection of electoral politics
was followed by a phase of tactical moderation that entailed the recognition that revolutionary
tactics were not serving the ideological goal well. Hence, to better serve dawa and to establish an
Islamic state, the Movement opted for tactical moderation, i.e., changing its strategy without
changing the core ideology.
The Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal first proposed to establish a political
party in 1992, but the government did not allow the Movement to form the party due to the
domestic armed conflict in neighboring Algeria (El-Khalfi interview, 2009). Then, the group
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sought to join an existing party’s legal umbrella and cooperation with Abdelkarim Al-Khatib’s
moribund Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPDC) (Desrues and Moyano
2001, 30). In 1997, the MPDC participated in legislative elections and won nine seats (Willis
2004). In 1998, the party also changed its name to the Party for Justice and Development (PJD).
However, neither the merger nor the name change greatly affected its Islamist ideology. While
the PJD abandoned revolutionary ideas, it maintained the core Islamist ideology. Over the course
of the next few years, the PJD underwent a substantial transformation, which resulted in
ideological moderation. First, PJD’s platform evolved toward a moderate position, which
emphasized pluralist democracy, liberal economy, and Muslim values. Second, the separation
between the PJD and the Islamic movement that the party hailed from (Movement of Unity and
Reform) facilitated further ideological moderation of the party.
In 2002, PJD officials held internal discussions on the party’s future direction. As
McFaul and Wittes (2008) note, electoral participation stimulated intraparty debates that are
deemed to play a key role in PJD’s moderation. Bilal Tlaidi, a member of the PJD’s national
council and a researcher on Islamic movements, stated that intra-party debates focused on party
identity: was the PJD an Islamic party or a political party with an Islamic reference? Tlaidi noted
the distinction as, “When you say an Islamic party, issues of Islamic identity and morals should
be the main priority for the party. When you say a political party with an Islamic reference, that
means the priority is public policy, but the solutions suggested by the PJD are based on Islamic
values, not political Islam” (Tlaidi interview, 2009). After 2002, party programs clearly
demonstrated that “public affairs” and problems around corruption and the economy took
precedence over issues of Islamic identity (El-Khalfi interview, 2009).
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PJD officials attributed the ideological transformation of the party to societal changes.
For example, former PJD leader Saad Eddin Uthmani emphasized such changes and stated, “It is
impossible for societal changes not to change parties” (Uthmani interview, 2009). Similarly,
Nezha El-Ouafi, a female legislator from the PJD, pointed out changes taking place both in
Morocco and worldwide, and the concomitant necessity for the party to transform itself to “keep
up” with the changes in their own constituency (El-Ouafi interview, 2009). The economic
liberalization process that Morocco went through in the 1980s and 1990s led to new issues and
demands in Morocco including economic development, democracy and social justice (Cohen
2004; Cammett 2007). Interviews with party officials show that the party considered
expectations from the public while formulating the new platform to echo the people’s “agenda”
(El-Khalfi and Uthmani interviews, 2009).
Specifically, the PJD party program shows a commitment to democracy (PJD Party
Program 2007, 1-3), which Amara defined as “transparency, clean elections, human rights, and
freedom of expression” (Amara interview, 2009). Critically, PJD officials likened the PJD to
Christian democratic parties (El-Khalfi interview, 2009). The PJD assumes that Islamic/Muslim
values represent the authentic identity of the party (and, of the Moroccan society) and therefore
they should be upheld; yet, it does not go as far as calling for the imposition of an Islamic state
on the society. Thus, the PJD was able to adopt a sincere democratic stance while keeping
Muslim values. Islamist parties, by contrast, generally take on a stronger position on the role of
Islam by calling for Islamic state and application of Islamic law, which prevents them from fully
embracing democratic principles such as freedom of conscience and minority rights.39
Economically, the PJD adopted a liberal discourse. Recognizing the “reality” of
increasing economic globalization, the PJD called attention to Morocco’s “need” for greater
39

For an excellent review of Islamism and identity politics in the Arab world, see Ismail (2004).
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integration into global markets and its potential to benefit from it (Amara and El-Ouafi
interviews, 2009). PJD legislator Lahcen Daoudi explained the “need” for Moroccan economic
liberalization as follows: “In Morocco, economic opening is a necessity because we are a small
state. It is not possible for us to develop with our domestic market only; we don’t have oil,
minerals, or gold” (Daoudi interview, 2009). Complementing this statement, another PJD official
argued that Moroccans are “benefiting” from economic liberalization, and hence the party favors
a liberal economic policy (Bouanou interview, 2009). Though similar in emphasizing market
economy, the PJD’s liberal economic stance differs from Islamist parties’ conventional promarket approach. Islamist parties ascribe a disproportionately large role for the state in managing
the economy, whereas the PJD’s economic stance does not include the state’s management of the
economy. Islamist parties’ vision of the state’s extensive role in regulating and supervising the
economy goes beyond the liberal economic perspective that the PJD adopts. Overall, the new
party mantra strives to capture the sentiment of its own constituency while attempting to be “a
party of all Morocco”: Asalah, Adalah, Tanmiyah (Authenticity/Origins, Justice, Development)
(El-Khalfi interview, 2009).
In addition to socio-economic changes, organizational factors such as separation of the
PJD from its founding organization, Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), also fostered the
ideological moderation process in late 1990s. The movement focused largely on “religious
activities, education, culture, social welfare” whereas the party dealt with “the management of
public affairs, political activities, and public policies.”40 The membership in the movement was
not a formal condition for membership in the party which enabled the party to embrace ideas not
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In 2007, the Moroccan daily Al-Tajdid (part of the MUR network) reported on movement-party separation,
identified the functions of the PJD and the MUR as distinct organizations, including various issues of disagreement
between the two such as the caliphate. “Al-Tamayuz Bayna al-Haraka wal-Hizb Masar La Raja’ah Fihi” [The
Separation between the Movement and the Party Now Irreversible] Al-Tajdid, 28-29 August, 2007.
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wholly endorsed by the movement. In 1997 elections all MPs except one were MUR members,
whereas only 31% of PJD candidates up for a parliamentary seat were also MUR members in
2002 elections. Moreover, currently a lower percentage of intermediate-level and local-level
officials in the party are also members of the MUR. The PJD set up its own “independent
mobilization resources” accompanied by financial independence, institutionalization of party
structure, and parallel structures (Wegner and Pellicer 2009). Overall, these changes show that
the party was becoming increasingly independent of the movement. Thus, separation from the
movement enabled the party to engage with a broader audience. Since the party did not represent
Islam in its political platform—thanks to the movement-party separation—it had a relatively a
greater opportunity to address the demands of a more diverse people.
Crucially, the PJD began enjoying greater popular support in the post-2002 period
following its ideological moderation. While the party won nine seats in the 1997 parliamentary
elections, it received 13% and 11% of the votes in 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively,
producing 42 and 46 parliamentary seats. The PJD won the plurality of seats (107 seats out of
395) during the most recent parliamentary elections in 2011. PJD’s reach to a wider audience is
analogous to PCI in Italy in the 1970s. The PJD aims to represent a broader constituency by
moderating its policy platform, in response to perceived societal changes. The change in the
constituency in the post-liberalization Morocco and the party’s willingness to separate the
Islamic movement from the party support my argument. Hence, I conclude that PJD’s move to
engage in ideological moderation in the post-2002 period is motivated by societal dynamics
rather than structural factors.
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F. Application of the Theoretical Framework to Other Cases
While the moderation by the PCI and PJD support the theoretical framework proposed in this
chapter, such a limited analysis prevents drawing more general inferences. In this section, I
briefly review the moderation of several other Islamist parties, examine various arguments
proposed by scholars to explain moderation of these parties, and test the theory’s generalizability
to other cases. While the cases reviewed here are far from being exhaustive, it presents a crosssection of arguments explaining Islamist moderation. Below, I briefly review the moderation of
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Wasat Party in Egypt, the Welfare Party, the Justice and
Development Party, and the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Hamas, and the Islamic Action Front
(IAF) in Jordan.
The moderation process of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, one of the oldest and
popular Islamist movements, started in 1980s (El-Ghobasy 2005). The MB experienced both
tactical and ideological moderation throughout its history. The MB gradually moved away from
Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-66) radical ideologies to a more moderate stance. The shift from
“uncompromising” views of Sayyid Qutb to Hasan el Banna's moderate views and an emphasis
on liberal democracy, an example of tactical moderation, occurred as a result of strategic
calculations and participation in parliamentary elections in the 1980s (El-Ghobashy 2005;
Harnisch and Mecham 2009; Schwedler 2007). Elections and working within the system are
viewed as ways to spread their message (Islam is the solution); the MB participated in the system
to spread the word of God (Abed-Kotob 1995; Harnisch and Mecham 2009). The party also
wanted to benefit from the increasing political openness of the new Mubarak regime (Harnisch
and Mecham 2009). Pargeter (2010) argues that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and
the fear of being labeled a terrorist organization pushed MB towards more moderation. On the
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other hand, the MB’s ideological moderation, which is demonstrated by the adoption of a more
“democratic” and “moderate” stance on various controversial issues such as women’s rights,
parties and political pluralism, and the role of Egyptian Copts, occurred as a result of
generational change− growing, better educated, young, pragmatic activists became dominant in
the MB−, and learning institutional rules of participation (state repression) (El-Ghobashy 2005;
Rurtherford 2006). The MB issued statements which emphasize women’s rights, party pluralism,
and equal rights for the Christian Copts in 1994-95. The MB’s ideological moderation gained
new momentum as a result of the passing of old, radical minded members in the 2000s (ElGhobashy 2005). However, whether MB’s ideological transformation is complete or not and
whether their commitment to democracy is sincere or not, are debatable questions (El-Ghobashy
2005; Masoud 2008; Pargeter 2010). The MB claims a commitment to liberal progressive ideas
while keeping references to Sheria law, which creates contradictions (Pargeter 2010). After the
2011 Arab Spring and toppling of Mubarek, The MB won the first free elections and came to
power in 2012. While the movement assures that their goal is “participation, not domination,”
President Mohamed Morsi’s recent decision to grant himself extraordinary powers increased
doubts about the movements’ commitment to liberal democracy (Masoud 2012). Tadros (2012)
argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is a pragmatic movement that has changed as a result of
changing political circumstances but the MB has a highly conservative ideology. To sum up,
some refer to the Muslim Brotherhood's transformation as involving extensive ideological
moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005; Rutherford 2006) whereas others view it merely as a tactical
maneuver to gradually establish an Islamic state (Abed-Kotob 1995; Schwedler 2007; Harnisch
and Mecham 2009; Pargeter 2010).
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The Wasat Party, which split from the MB and formed in 1996, also took the path of
ideological moderation and altered positions on certain controversial issues such as the inclusion
of women in parliament, and advocacy of equal rights for Egyptian Copts (Stacher 2002;
Wickham 2004). The Wasat Party’s ideological moderation was largely driven by strategic
calculations, social learning, and intra-party debates. The core beliefs and values of leaders
changed as a result of interaction with seculars and cross-ideological cooperation (Clark 2006;
Wickham 2004). Moreover, fear of repression, demand to seize new political opportunities and
avoid constraints with the autocratic elite also contributed to the ideological moderation of the
party (Wickham 2004). Wickham argues that strategic moderation leads to changes in the public
rhetoric and behavior of actors which can eventually cause change in ultimate goals. In other
words, “The mask becomes the face” (Hoeber 2003, as cited in Wickham 2004, 225).
The Justice and Development Party of Turkey (JDP) engaged in ideological moderation
whereas the Welfare Party (WP), and the Felicity Party (FP) experienced only tactical
moderation. Both the JDP and the FP are offshoots of the Welfare Party which was closed by the
Constitutional Court after the 1998 postmodern military coup. Turkish politics is characterized
by a power struggle between the secular elite (represented by the Constitutional Court, the
military and leftist parties) and religious parties. Islamic parties were banned from politics
several times by the Constitutional Court since they are regarded as a threat to secular
democracy.
The WP gained a plurality of votes and came to power in the 1996 elections. Survival
concerns and the realization of institutional constraints, such as the fear of closure by the
Constitutional court, motivated the tactical moderation of both the WP and the FP (Mecham
2004). Even though the WP was committed to liberal democratic principles, it remained an anti-
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system party; the election campaigns emphasized creation of an interest-free Islamic economy,
anti-Western sentiments, and religious freedom (Mecham 2004, 342). When the WP came to
power, Erbakan, the leader of the party, visited Islamist states such as Iran and Libya in order to
establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries. Erbakan also invited religious leaders to the
prime minister’s residence which led to criticism by the secular elite and the eventual closure of
the party (Mecham 2004). The members of the WP established the Virtue Party after the closure
of the WP. Meanwhile, there were intra-party debates and a power struggle between the
reformist young generation and old members who were loyal to Erbakan. The Virtue party was
also eventually closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001 since it was regarded as continuation
of the WP. Then, two splinter parties established: reformists and more pragmatists established
the JDP and those loyal to Erbakan formed the Felicity Party. The JDP came to power in the
2002 elections and focused on legislative and constitutional reforms that promote democracy,
market economy, and pro-EU reforms while avoiding religious references. Institutional
constraints−political learning from past experiences−, generational change−existence of young,
reformist leaders−, socio-economic changes,

and electoral incentives−the recognition that

majority votes for centrist parties−motivated the ideological moderation of the JDP (Mecham
2004; Ozbudun 2006; Tezcur 2010; Yilmaz 2009) On the other hand, even though the FP faced
similar institutional constraints with the JDP, its religious ideology remained intact. Tezcur
(2010) argues that the unresponsiveness of the FP to institutional constraints was because of the
lack of reform-minded leaders. The leaders of the FP kept a rigid Islamist ideology which
prevented their full moderation.
Hamas is another influential Islamist group that went through tactical moderation for a
limited time period. Hamas chose violent resistance rather than electoral politics and acted like a
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spoiler during the Palestinian-Israel peace process in 1990s. However, Hamas changed its
strategy by declaring a unilateral ceasefire towards Israel in 2003 and participating in elections in
2005-2006. Hamas also changed uncompromising views regarding the borders of the future
Palestinian state and accepted pre-1967 borders. Hovdenak (2009) argues that international
pressure and demand for recognition led to the moderation of Hamas. However,
unresponsiveness of international actors to Hamas’s compromises and the boycott of the Hamas
government after the 2006 elections weakened moderate leaders within Hamas. As a result,
Hamas re-radicalized and violently took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Hovdenak 2009). The
international constraints played a significant role during both the moderation and reradicalization process of Hamas. In other words, international actors’ unwillingness to reward the
tactical moderation of the Hamas back-fired the moderation process.
Finally, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan experienced tactical and arguably
ideological moderation to a certain extent. The IAF’s ideological platform emphasizes
implementation of sharia, denouncing corruption, liberation of Palestine, women’s equality
within an Islamic framework, freedom and democracy. The leaders of IAF claim that the party
believes in democracy, not as a tactic but as a strategy. The goal is Islamization of society,
gradually and democratically. Robinson (1997) explains the IAF’s embracement of democracy
(tactical moderation) with strategic reasons; mainly to protect organizational and political
interests and to secure survival of the party in a repressive regime. The IAF played by the rules
of the game even though the King adopted a new electoral law (1993) which limited the IAF’s
chances of gaining seats in the parliament. The King also signed a peace treaty with Israel (1994)
which was highly criticized by the IAF. Nevertheless, the IAF did not resort to violence. The
IAF started to cooperate with leftists and liberals by the mid-1990s. Schwedler (2006) argues
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that the IAF moderated both behaviorally (what I call tactical moderation) and to some extent
ideologically. According to Schwedler (2006; 2007), political inclusion leads to cooperation with
other parties (and hence tactical moderation) but inclusion alone is insufficient for ideological
moderation; internal party debates within the party and Islamic justification of new
practices−cooperation with other parties and participation− produced ideological moderation of
IAF.
To sum up, two observations stand out from the review of these moderation cases. First,
with two notable exceptions (the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Islamic
Action Front for which both tactical and ideological moderation explanations exist in the
literature), the distinction between tactical and ideological moderation largely correlates with
how Islamist moderation is conceptualized as a dependent variable. Cases of tactical moderation
and how they are operationalized contrasts sharply with cases of ideological moderation. While
factors like renunciation of violence, use of electoral politics, and cross-ideological cooperation
are offered as observable implications of tactical moderation, ideological moderation is marked
by the moderation of Islamist ideology on democratic values, pluralism, women’s rights, market
economy, and adoption of more centrist positions.
Second, regarding the causes of moderation, there is some level of convergence, although
the convergence is to a lesser extent than the one observed for types of Islamist moderation.
Among the causes of tactical moderation mentioned in the literature are inclusion, international
pressure, political liberalization, internal debates, and organizational survival/interest. By
contrast, factors leading to ideological moderation are less coherent: institutional constraints,
rules of participation, generational differences, social learning, internal conflict, participation,
state repression, electoral concerns, and socioeconomic changes. Some of these factors are, in
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fact, reminiscent of factors leading to tactical moderation. The incongruence between the
theoretical framework proposed in this chapter and the factors assumed to lead to ideological
moderation is partly related to the way ideological moderation is conceptualized as ideological
change. As discussed above, there exists a certain level of disagreement as to whether certain
groups actually went through a process of ideological transformation or not. Overall, the
theoretical framework largely captures the variation in Islamist moderation in a cross-national
setting. Nonetheless, a more rigorous test of the theory is necessary to confirm the preliminary
findings in this analysis.
G. Conclusion
Moderation has been both a key term in popular discourse and an important research question in
the scholarly literature recently. In this chapter, I reviewed the Islamist moderation literature and
demonstrated that the literature thus far failed to produce a systematic approach to analyze
Islamist moderation. Specifically, I showed that moderation stands for a wide array of ideas
ranging from limited attitudinal self-restraint (or, being tolerant) to far-reaching ideological
renunciation and democratization. Moreover, there is no consensus among scholars about the
underlying causes of moderation; a number of competing arguments are provided to explain
moderation of Islamist parties. My goal in this chapter was to introduce a preliminary framework
to examine Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion across a wide range of contexts. To this
end, I examined the literature on Communist parties’ moderation in Western Europe. Because
Communist parties went through different waves of moderation throughout the 20th century just
as Islamist parties have been going through in recent years, the case of Communist parties and
their moderation is analytically valuable.
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I identified two kinds of moderation: tactical and ideological. Tactical moderation refers
to a limited kind of moderation in which radical parties renounce use of violence but the antisystem ideology remains largely intact, and democracy is instrumental in achieving the
ideological goal. Ideological moderation, in contrast, refers to an extensive effort in abandoning
major elements of the anti-system ideology on issues such as the Islamic state, economy and
pluralist democracy. Building on this framework, I presented several case studies. The first one
was the moderation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) until the 1990s. The second case study
was that of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) from its origins in the 1970s
until the early 2000s. Both cases served to demonstrate the theoretical framework developed in
this chapter.
The moderation processes of the PJD and the PCI indicate that similar paths of
moderation occur as a result of similar causal factors. The PCI’s decision to adopt the Popular
Front strategy and to leave the revolutionary path was largely due to the international context,
namely, the failure of revolutionary strategies in other parts of the world. On the other hand, the
PJD decided to participate in the political system and recognized the political and religious
legitimacy of the monarchic regime since the more radical form of the group was banned. In both
cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic alternatives were the driving force
for tactical moderation. Neither the PCI nor the PJD sacrificed ideological principles while
participating in the political system and maintaining the end-goals of communism and Islamic
state at this stage. Socioeconomic changes in the 1950s and the 1960s due to rapid economic
growth in Italy and the economic liberalization process throughout the 1990s in Morocco
underlie ideological moderation in both cases in the following decades. A preliminary analysis of
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the moderation process of other Islamist parties provides partial support for the theoretical
framework developed in this chapter.
The findings of previous chapters indicate that religious ideology and/or Islam is not a
significant factor in driving conflicts and decision to resort to violence in the Muslim world;
other socio-economic factors and political opportunities/ constraints largely shape the likelihood
of eruption of domestic conflicts. The findings of this chapter are in line with previous findings.
Like radicalization and violence, moderation is significantly influenced by socio-economic
factors as well as international constraints. Ideologies and ideas change over time. Even though
some Islamist parties initially moderate for strategic purposes and survival concerns, changing
electoral dynamics push for further ideological moderation. Thus, one can conclude that
political parties even with rigid radical ideologies may not resist societal changes and hence
gradually moderate. Finally, the similarities between moderation of Communist parties and
Islamist parties suggest that there is no “Islamic exceptionalism”. Radical Islamist parties are
similar to other radical parties and respond to changing societal conditions in a similar way.
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Appendix 1: List of Tables
Table 4.1: Arguments on Islamist Moderation in the Literature
Definition of
moderation
Schwedler (2006) Inclusion
Participate
in “Movement from a
democratic processes
relatively closed and
rigid worldview to one
more open and tolerant
of
alternative
perspectives”
Wickham (2004)
Inclusion & social Ideological moderation Ideological moderation
learning
and respect for the
democratic processes
Brooks (2002)
Inclusion & political Participation
in
liberalization
democratic processes
El-Ghobashy
Ideological moderation
Ideological
(2005)
Participation
and
democratic
transformation
understanding
Clark (2006)
1)
Spirit
of
compromise, 2) more
than a mere “tactical”
Cross-ideological
compromise, and 3)
cooperation
intra-organizational
discussion
of
compromise
Robinson (1997)
Organizational
selfEndorsing democracy
Democracy
interest
Wegner
and Party autonomy
1)
Level
of
Pellicer (2009)
disagreement between
“Increasing
flexibility
party and Islamic social
towards core ideological
movement, and 2) level
beliefs”
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other (left) parties
Somer (2007)
State repression
Ideological moderation
Nasr (2009)
Zakaria (2004)

Independent variable

Type of moderation

Economy/capitalism
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Economic liberalization

Ideological moderation
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Moving away
extremism

from

Table 4.2: Summary of Cases

Premoderation

Italian Communist Party (PCI)

Party for Justice and Development (PJD)

- Marxist/Leninist ideology
- Armed struggle
- Socialist revolution

- Moroccan society in jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance)
- Use of force legitimate
- Political participation un-Islamic

Change
Tactical
moderation

Ideological
moderation

Causes

- Risks associated
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of
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- Reach Islamic state
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Islamic
law
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game
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Morocco
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parties
(political
participation)

Intraparty
discussions
on
party identity &
direction (2002)&
separation of the
movement and the
party

Socioeconomic
changes in the post1980
economic
liberalization
period
- To appeal to a
wider audience

- Shift from idealism to
pragmatism
Democratic
commitment
- Support for liberal
economy
and
globalization
- Emphasis on Islamic
values, not Islamic state

- Disassociation from
the S.U.
- Break with Leninist
ideology
- Uncertain democratic
commitment
- Conflicting views
from the party
- Support for Christian
Democratic
governments
- Accept NATO and
European integration
- Accept free market
capitalism
Democratic
commitment

Appendix 2:List of Interviewees
Mustapha El-Khalfi – PJD official and editor of Al-Tajdid newspaper; Rabat, December 8,
2009.
Saad Eddin Uthmani – Former secretary general, PJD; Rabat, December 8, 2009.
Dr. Driss Bouanou – Youth leader and member of Committee on Foreign Relations, PJD;
Rabat, December 10, 2009.
Abdulkadir Amara – PJD parliamentarian and member of the PJD General Secretariat; Rabat
December 17, 2009.
Bilal Tlaidi – PJD National Council member, independent researcher, and reporter for Al-Tajdid
newspaper; Rabat, December 17, 2009.
Lahcen Daoudi – PJD parliamentarian; Rabat, December 18, 2009.
Nezha El-Ouafi – PJD parliamentarian and academician; Rabat, December 23, 2009.
Noureddine Karbal – PJD parliamentarian; Rabat, December 23, 2009.
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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion
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The recent uprisings and the ongoing violent/nonviolent protests in the Middle East once again
led to popular debates about what drives conflict in the Muslim world. There are a number of
competing arguments that explain driving forces of violence in the Muslim world, radicalization,
de-radicalization, and moderation of Islamist parties/groups. These explanations focus on a
variety of factors such as socio-economic and demographic factors, religion, culture, political
opportunities, and constraints. Specifically, there is a theoretical debate about whether Islam
fosters violence or not. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars about the extent to which
religion may promote political violence.
This dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political
violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict,
group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party
moderation. In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing
domestic armed conflict, whereas chapter 3 analyzes conditions under which ethno-political
organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their goals. Chapter 4 examines moderation of
Islamist parties.
I argue that religious denomination alone does not necessarily make countries more or
less conflict-prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to
resort to violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. While numerous
conflicts in the world may be framed as religious, ignoring root causes of violence and solely
attributing conflict-proneness to cultural or ideological factors would be an oversimplification
of these complex events. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslim-majority countries
are more conflict/violence-prone fail to control for factors that increase the risk of insurgency,
such as socio-economic development, state repression, youth bulges, and oil dependence, and
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confound many variables under “Islam”. It is not possible to draw a causal relationship between
Islam and conflict-proneness without controlling for factors that increase the risk of domestic
conflict. Below, I review the general findings from the preceding analysis of this dissertation.
First, I compare and contrast findings of chapter 2 and chapter 3, and organize my findings
based on key concepts tested in both chapters: religion, demographic factors, grievances,
political opportunity structure, and resources. I also suggest potential explanations for some of
the null findings, and provide suggestions for future research. Next, I summarize the findings
from chapter 4, which focus on Islamist party moderation. Finally, I conclude by discussing the
policy implications of my overall findings.
Religion
What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what
extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? These research questions motivated my
dissertation. I conducted a number of empirical analyses to evaluate the impact of religion in
fostering violence at both state-level and group-level. The overall findings indicate that,
contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, neither religious fractionalization nor Islam
promotes conflict once socio-economic and political factors are taken into account.
First, religious fractionalization is negative and insignificant in all of the regressions in
chapter 2, which suggests that religious diversity is not a significant factor in inciting domestic
armed conflict. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent in Muslim-plurality
states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an environment that is
very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are characterized by more
repressive regimes, oil dependent economies, more poverty, and a higher proportion of youth
bulges. While Islam appears to be significantly correlated to domestic armed conflict onset in a
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bivariate regression, the significance of Islam disappears once the correlates of domestic armed
conflict are controlled for. Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with
various explanatory variables remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying
different operationalization of Islam –use of Muslim-plurality, Muslim-majority or Muslim
proportion−, and alternative model specifications. Third, the findings from chapter 3 also
confirm that Islamist ideology is not a significant factor in driving violence at the group level.
Even though the limitation of the analyses to Middle Eastern region prevents making broad
generalizations and comparing conflict-proneness of organizations in Muslim countries with
non-Muslim ones, not all of the ethno-political organizations in the Middle East are inspired by
religious/Islamist ideology. Thus, I was able to control for the influence of religion by
comparing the conflict-proneness of organizations that have a religious/Islamist ideology with
non-religious ones. Like the Muslim-plurality variable in the previous chapter, Islamist ideology
is insignificant in all of the models in chapter 3.
Demographic Factors
The demographic structure of a country has the potential to increase the risk of domestic
armed conflict and group-level violence. Specifically, increasing population growth and the
existence of large youth cohorts make countries more prone to conflict/violence. The countries
that have a higher total population are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflict
since it is hard to control people and deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Increasing
population may also lead to resource scarcity, higher unemployment rates, and poverty.
Moreover, the existence of a youth bulge− which is defined as the proportion of young males
between the ages of 15-24 to total adult population− increases both grievances (especially when
coupled with poverty, unemployment, and repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel
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recruits (Urdal 2006). For example, some scholars argue that youth bulges have played a
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; it is argued that those young
people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled
against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011).
The findings from chapter 2 suggest that total population indeed increases the risk of
domestic armed conflict, whereas the impact of youth bulge is inconclusive. While youth bulge
is insignificant in most of the regressions, the Islam-youth bulge interaction in Model 8 is
positive and significant, suggesting that Muslim-plurality countries with a higher proportion of
young males are more conflict-prone than the rest of the sample. However, further analysis from
the marginal effect of youth bulge suggests that Muslim-plurality states become more conflictprone than non-Muslim countries for only extremely high values of youth bulges. While the
impact of youth bulge in chapter 2 is puzzling, the findings from chapter 3 indicate that youth
bulges significantly increase the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Youth
bulge is positive and significant in all of the models in Chapter 3. I also interact youth bulge
with several explanatory variables in chapter 3 to explore whether the positive influence of
youth bulges is conditional on other socio-economic or political factors. I find that the youth
bulges- autocracy interaction is positive and significant, whereas youth-democracy, youthrepression, youth-economic grievance, and youth-Islamist ideology interactions are all
insignificant. Obviously, youth bulges create more problems in autocratic countries than
democratic ones.
Future studies may focus on exploring the role of youth bulges in increasing the risk of
domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. What makes these youth population more prone
to the use of violence and why are they more conflict-prone than other age cohorts? This is an
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important research question which remains underexplored. Grievances that stem from
unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions, such as high unemployment rate, high
income inequality, and the existence of oppressive/ authoritarian regimes, may be mediating
between the use of violence and youth bulges. Future research can test the conditional impact of
youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with unemployment rate, education, or income
inequality. Currently, I control for GDP per capita, regime type, and repression but existing data
on education, income inequality, and unemployment have many missing observations.
Grievances
How significant are grievances in fostering violence and domestic armed conflict?
According to Gurr (1970)’s relative deprivation theory, social, economic, and political
grievances lead to feelings of relative deprivation and frustration, which in turn motivates
individuals to resort to violence. Yet, there is no solid empirical support for the relative
deprivation hypothesis; existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of
grievances in fostering violence (Canetti et al 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Mousseau 2011; Regan 2009). I examine the impact of economic,
political, and cultural grievances in fostering domestic armed conflict and group-level violence
in chapters 2 and 3, respectively.
In chapter 2, I use GDP per capita to operationalize economic grievances. Higher values
of GDP per capita indicate more economic development and hence fewer grievances. I rely on
GDP per capita, which is a very crude proxy of economic grievances, due to limitations in data
availability of better indicators at the cross-national level. Even though there is a negative
relationship between GDP per capita and likelihood of domestic armed conflict, it reaches
statistical significance in only Models 5 and 8. GDP per capita loses statistical significance
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when oil dependence is added to the model. Oil dependence is known to increase risk of
domestic armed conflict. Perhaps, oil-rich countries with high GDP per capitas are still prone to
conflict. In other words, the negative impact of GDP per capita may be overwhelmed by the
positive influence of oil dependence in promoting domestic conflict. Political and cultural
grievances are not tested in chapter 2 since there is no cross-national data available to measure
these concepts.
In chapter 3, I use three ordinal variables from the MAROB organizational behavior data
to test the impact of economic, political, and cultural grievances in promoting violence at the
group-level. Unlike the previous chapter, the findings from chapter 3 suggest that economic
grievances significantly increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political
organizations, whereas neither political grievances nor cultural grievances have any significant
impact. However, caution is necessary when interpreting the insignificance of political
grievances. All of the ethno-political organizations in the MAROB dataset have political
grievances, which prevents controlling for the impact of this concept since there is little
variation in this explanatory variable. I only compared conflict-proneness of separationist
groups/ independence movements to those that have a less severe political grievance and the
difference between the two was not statistically significant. In sum, even though grievances
seem to increase the risk of violence, the findings from both chapters remain inconclusive.
Future research can explore the conditional effect of grievances− such as interacting economic
grievances with youth bulges – and use better indicators of socio-economic grievances such as
income inequality or unemployment rate if data become available.
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Political Opportunity Structure
Political opportunities and constraints available in a society significantly influence the
decision to resort to violence. If political institutions give people the opportunity to express their
dissatisfaction/frustration through nonviolent/conventional means, the likelihood of violence
and conflict declines since rational individuals would prefer nonviolent options, which are less
risky and proven to be more successful, compared to violent ones (Stephan and Chenoweth
2008). In other words, to rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent action is the only
option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming grievances into
militant action. While exclusive and repressive regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes
decrease the probability of use of violence (Hafez 2003).
State repression and regime type are used in both chapters to test the impact of political
opportunities/constraints in fostering violence. Repression is a double edged sword; repression
can deter rebellion by increasing the cost of collective action, but it can also increase risk of
conflict through increasing grievances. In chapter 2, I use the CIRI integrity score to test the
impact of repression. Repression was positive and significant, whereas its squared term was
negative and significant in most of the models. Low levels of repression increase the risk of
domestic armed conflict, whereas high levels of repression actually decrease the risk of conflict,
since collective action becomes very costly under extremely repressive regimes. The findings
from chapter 3 confirm that repression in general fosters violence; ethno-political organizations
that are repressed by the state are more likely to use violent strategies than other organizations.
The literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there is a curvilinear
relationship between regime type and likelihood of domestic armed conflict; transitionary
regimes are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflicts than both democracies and
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autocracies since transitionary regimes usually lack the capacity to deter insurgency as well as
the nonviolent means to express frustration. I use the Polity score from the Polity IV project and
create a dichotomous variable for anocracies to examine the impact of regime type in chapter 2.
The empirical analysis confirms that transitionary regimes are indeed more conflict prone; an
anocracy dummy is positive and significant in three of the five models and barely loses
significance in the remaining two models. However, unlike theoretical expectations, the
findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not seem to affect the decision to resort to
violence by ethno-political organizations. I use a dichotomous variable for democracies and it
was insignificant in all of the regressions. Alternatively, I include the polity score and its
squared term in the analysis and it was also insignificant. 41 One potential reason for
insignificance of regime type at the group-level analysis could be selection bias; the dataset
includes only Middle Eastern countries. Most Middle Eastern countries are non-democratic;
there is little variation in regime type among Middle Eastern countries. Israel is the only country
which is coded as ‘free’ by Freedom House and Israel has a long history of conflict with
Palestinians, which makes it a democratic but violence-prone nation. Future studies may
examine more countries, and test the impact of regime type in fostering violence by ethnopolitical organizations.
Resources
Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the importance of resources required to
mobilize rather than grievances in promoting rebellion. It is argued that frustration is not
sufficient for mobilization; groups need resources to transfer individual frustration into group
mobilization. Therefore, both external and internal resources affect mobilization capacity and
the probability of rebellion (McCarthy and Zald 1977). At the state level, the existence of oil or
41

The models with a continuous polity score are not reported here, but they are available upon request.
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other natural resources are expected to increase the risk of domestic armed conflict. Ross (2006)
claims that oil and other minerals increase the risk of conﬂict because they make independence
more desirable for resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence
of natural resources creates opportunities to rebel. However, oil money can also be used to coopt potential dissidents, especially in politically corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of
domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). At the group-level, external support for an organization from
diasporas or from other international actors and domestic support generally determine available
resources to mobilize and capability to engage in collective action.
I control for both oil-dependence and natural resource-dependence in chapter 2 and find
that countries that have a higher proportion of oil rents as well as other natural resource rents are
at greater risk of experiencing domestic armed conflict. In chapter 3, I include two dichotomous
variables from the MAROB data that measure internal and external support for the organization
to proxy resources available to ethno-political organizations. While external support increases
the probability of violence by these organizations, domestic support for the organizations does
not have a significant impact. Overall, these findings indicate that resources are indeed crucial
in promoting political violence.
In sum, the findings from chapter 2 and chapter 3 suggest that state repression, regime
type, availability of resources, youth bulges, and grievances all affect the likelihood of domestic
armed conflict as well as the decision to resort to violence by ethno-political organizations.
While state repression, economic grievances, and resources are found to be significant in both
chapters, the impact of other factors varies depending on the level of analysis. There is a
curvilinear relationship between regime type and the risk of domestic armed conflict at the
state-level of analysis, whereas regime type fails to reach statistical significance when the
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analysis is conducted at the group-level. On the contrary, youth bulge is positive and
statistically significant in all of the Models in chapter 3, whereas it is insignificant in most of the
Models in chapter 2. Finally, religion fails to reach significance in all of the regressions in both
chapters. One can conclude that socio-economic and political conditions rather than religion
largely determine the decision to resort to violence.
Moderation of Islamist Parties
In chapter 4, I analyze the moderation of Islamist parties, which has been a common
trend for many Islamist parties. By building on the findings of the Communist moderation
literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist moderation: tactical
vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation occurs when radical parties renounce the use of
violence and decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve political goals without
compromising their core ideology. Structural factors such as political liberalization,
international factors such as failure of revolutionary tactics in other parts of the world, and state
repression drive tactical moderation of radical parties. Some parties go beyond the tactical
moderation and change their ideological positions on democracy, the economic system, and the
political role of Islam, which I call Ideological moderation. Ideological moderation is largely
driven by electoral motives. In other words, Islamist parties moderate their radical ideologies as
a response to societal changes such as economic liberalization, economic growth, generational
changes, electoral loss, and changing voter preferences to gain greater popular support.
Empirically, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Party for Justice and
Development (PJD) in Morocco are analyzed in comparative perspective. PCI’s tactical
moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy
and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure
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organizational survival. Likewise, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco opted for
tactical moderation in order to better serve dawa (religious mission) activities and to establish
an Islamic state. In both cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic
alternatives were the driving forces for tactical moderation. On the other hand, societal changes
and electoral dynamics in Italy led to the ideological moderation of the PCI. Similarly, electoral
participation, intraparty debates, societal changes, and organizational factors such as separation
of the PJD from its founding organization fostered the ideological moderation process.
Policy Implications
The research questions explored in this dissertation are relevant for both scholars and
policy makers. The findings of this research can help policy makers in developing strategies that
will reduce the threat of religious extremism and domestic armed conflict. I did explore the role
of religion and Islamist ideology in driving domestic armed conflict or lower level violence in
the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focused on Islamist party
moderation. The overall findings indicate that religion by itself does not drive conflict;
unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions explain the high hazard of domestic
conflict in the Muslim world. This is good news for policy makers; it is possible to contain or
decrease these domestic conflicts by implementing policies that will alleviate some of the social,
economic, and political problems. Hypothetically, there would be little one can do to eliminate
these conflicts if religion was the major cause since religious preference can hardly change.
Among all of the socio-economic and political factors analyzed in this dissertation, state
repression is found to be significant in all of the regressions as well as in the qualitative analysis.
While repression has the potential to deter insurgency, to foster insurgency, to motivate
radicalization or moderation of Islamist parties, the overall findings suggest that repression
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usually breeds more violence. Therefore, policy makers should reconsider the use of repressive
measures to deter opposition groups. While spreading democracies may decrease the probability
of conflict in the long run, transition periods are usually characterized with more violence and
higher rates of domestic armed conflict. Even though the analysis is limited to the Middle East,
the findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not affect ethno-political
organizations’ decision to resort to violence. Perhaps, it is repressiveness of the regime rather
than its autocratic nature that fosters violence. Arguably, even democratic countries could be
repressive to a certain extent.
Finally, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process)
is necessary for better policymaking in the Middle East. Islamist parties are key political actors,
which are regarded as the only viable opposition group in many Muslim countries. Islamist
parties won the most recent elections in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and in Morocco. Whether
Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of
transitions in the region. The preceding analysis suggests that Islamist parties act strategically
and respond to societal changes. Participation in the political system fosters moderation and deradicalization whereas exclusive and repressive policies lead to radicalization and violence.
Therefore, developing policies that encourage Islamist parties’ political participation may help
to minimize threat of religious extremism.
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